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THE CASE AGAINST INCOME AVERAGING
Neil H. Buchanan*
Should tax liability be based on annual income or on the average of
a taxpayer's income earned over the space of several years (or even a
lifetime)? This article assesses proposals to replace the current method
of computing taxes with a system that would allow taxpayers to smooth
out their income tax liabilities by offsetting high-income years with low-
income years. While the usual discussion of this issue revolves around
supposed horizontal inequities, I show that it is not clear that the
current system generates horizontal inequities at all; and even if it does,
I suggest as a normative issue that these horizontal inequities alone are
not sufficiently important to justify a change in the method of
computing tax liability.
Looked at from a vertical equity perspective, however, I note that
income averaging targeted toward lower income earners can be a
helpful way to provide relief to workers who have uneven earnings
patterns. I thus endorse a very limited averaging plan that would apply
to the working poor and near-poor, allowing them to reduce their
federal tax liability and to avoid losing EITC benefits due to temporary
swings in income.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The topic of fundamental tax reform recently made a brief
reappearance on the political agenda. In November 2005, a report
was issued by a presidential panel that had been created specifically to
recommend a path toward a better tax system.1 Although the panel's
report thus far seems not to be generating political action, the very
fact that a highly respected group of scholars and policymakers was
asked to weigh in on the topic attests to the enduring importance of
2the issue. We can be confident that, even if the panel's proposals are
not adopted in their current form, the pervasive dissatisfaction with
our current tax system that led to the creation of the panel in the first
place will continue to fester and lead to future proposals for reforms
large and small.
While most tax reform discussions have revolved around
proposals for changing the current federal income tax system into
some form of a consumption tax (a national sales tax, the so-called
Flat Tax, a value-added tax, etc.),3 it is important also to consider
whether it is possible to enact reforms that would preserve the
traditional income tax base yet improve upon our current system -
PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY PANEL ON FED. TAX REFORM, SIMPLE, FAIR & PRO-
GROWTH: PROPOSALS TO FIX AMERICA'S TAX SYSTEM (2005), available at
http://www.taxreformpanel.gov/final-report/.
2 The panel's tax proposals are receiving at least some attention from Congress.
The first hearing on the panel report was held in February 2006. See Transforming
the Tax Code: An Examination of the President's Tax Reform Panel
Recommendations: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Tax, Finance, and Exports and
Rural Enterprises, Agriculture and Technology of the H. Small Business Comm., 109th
Cong. (2006). The prospects for any real action on the proposals are, of course,
debatable. See, e.g., Senate's Top Democratic Tax Writer Declares Tax Reform Report
'Dead,' ABERDEEN AM. NEWS, Feb. 8, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR 2171894 ("The
Senate's top Democratic tax writer said Tuesday that a presidentially appointed
panel's recommendations for overhauling tax laws don't stand a chance in
Congress.").
3 See, e.g., John K. McNulty, Flat Tax, Consumption Tax, Consumption- Type
Income Tax Proposals in the United States: A Tax Policy Discussion of Fundamental
Tax Reform, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2095 (2000).
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and most importantly, that would maintain and enhance the
redistributive role served by the current income tax. A proposal long
advocated by the late Columbia University economics professor
William Vickrey known as "cumulative averaging" (or "income
averaging," or simply "averaging") might be one such system.
Vickrey argued that his system would tax income in a more accurate
sense than the current tax system does, offering a possible alternative
to the array of consumption tax proposals in policy debates over
fundamental tax reform.4
The current U.S. personal income tax, which assesses taxes on an
annual basis in a system with graduated tax rates, contains within it
the potential for unequal treatment, imposing different amounts of tax
liability based on the volatility or smoothness of taxpayers' earnings
streams. A taxpayer who earns large amounts of income in one year
and low amounts in other years might pay significantly more total tax
over those years than another person who earns the same total
amount of income but whose annual income is relatively constant. In
other words, two people who earn equal amounts of income over the
space of years can be treated quite differently by our tax system. The
fundamental appeal of taxing average income is that it can address
this potential inequity.
All inequities are not created equal, however. No system is
perfect, and any particular imperfection is only worthy of our
attention - and the expenditure of effort to enact new policies - if
its continued existence meaningfully compromises important values or
goals of society. This article, therefore, takes an approach that is to
my knowledge unique in the literature on income averaging. Most
importantly, I ask whether we should even be concerned about the
possible inequity that averaging would mitigate - if, indeed, it is truly
an inequity at all. I conclude that we should not, except for a very
limited part of the problem that affects lower-income Americans and
that could be fixed by a rather straightforward, very limited form of
income averaging.
Before embarking on the analysis that leads to my endorsement
of limited income averaging, I first discuss in quite basic terms the
purposes of a tax system from the standpoint of society and the
democratic system. I do so at some length to ground the discussion of
tax inequities in the realm of social goals rather than in the abstract
design of tax systems.
4 See infra Part II.B for a description of the mechanics of Vickrey's cumulative
averaging system.
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I then devote the third Part of this article to a description of the
concept of income averaging, summarizing the use of averaging
mechanisms in the U.S. tax system, both past and present. I also
review the rather thin (but very informative) tax policy literature on
income averaging. To provide a starting point for policy analysis, I
then describe Vickrey's proposal for a full-scale replacement of the
current U.S. income tax system with a system that would - as a
central organizing principle - levy tax on the basis of a taxpayer's
average rather than annual income.
Because the purported problem that Vickrey identified was a
matter of horizontal inequity - two taxpayers who seem to be alike in
a meaningful way (i.e., having received the same amount of income
over the course of their lives) are treated differently by the tax system
- I begin the fourth Part of the article by directly confronting the
moral case for redressing horizontal inequities in the tax system. That
case turns out not to be especially compelling, in part because the
supposed horizontal inequity is not as much a matter of treating
similarly-situated taxpayers differently as it initially seems, and
because the moral force behind the urge to correct horizontal
inequities is somewhat surprisingly connected to the question of
vertical inequity. Put simply, learning that we inadvertently treat two
high-income (but similarly situated) people differently because of an
unintended side effect of the tax system is not as worrying as learning
that we treat two low-income (but otherwise similarly situated) people
differently. The morality of horizontal inequity becomes more
compelling as the life situations of the taxpayers in question become
more worrisome.
This observation leads naturally to a direct discussion of
progressivity, the social goal that has held greatest sway over U.S. tax
policy for the last century. While volumes have been written about
progressivity in tax policy, I briefly summarize here only those
arguments based on utilitarian assessments of inequality, Rawlsian
concerns with the least well-off members of society, and Judeo-
Christian ethics. The goal is to suggest that, even when thinking about
a tax policy issue that appears to be a matter of possible horizontal
inequity, the more important focus should be on how the tax system
affects the least well-off members of society.
Assessing income averaging from the normative perspective
described above, it turns out that much of the scholarly discussion
about income averaging has focused on a purported inequity at the
high end of the income spectrum: people who temporarily earn very
high incomes due to short-term success pay annual taxes at the same
2006] 1155
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rates as do people whose high incomes are a permanent part of their
lives. Even if this implication of annual tax assessment is viewed as a
horizontal inequity in the system - and, as noted, I offer reasons to
believe that it might not be inequitable, even from a horizontal
perspective - I argue that it is not a major policy concern. It might
be somewhat unfortunate and would not exist in a perfect world, but it
does not offend any serious egalitarian concern that should motivate
tax reformers to take action.
For low-income earners, though, the concern raised by volatile
earning streams can be very real and serious. Fortunately, the
problems in this area can be addressed by a targeted system that
allows the least well-paid workers to avoid the inequities in the
current system.' This solution can be implemented, moreover, as a
discrete policy measure rather than as part of a plan to completely
rewrite the tax code or to change the basic accounting period on
which the tax code is based.
Middle-income earners are, perhaps inevitably, a close call. I
summarize some arguments for and against using an averaging system
to help subsidize the temporary departure of secondary earners from
the work force to take care of children and other family members,
concluding that there are probably better ways to deal with child care
needs and that, in any case, it is not clear whether those who do not
leave the work force should pay higher taxes so that those who do
leave temporarily can pay lower taxes. The system of limited
averaging that I endorse can be extended upward into the middle
class, of course, but it appears that the strongest case for averaging
implies that we should aim our policy reforms at helping those low-
income earners whose incomes are earned in fits and starts.
If equity is not meaningfully improved by adopting a tax system
with income averaging available to all taxpayers, what of the other
traditional goals of tax design: simplicity and efficiency? With so little
to gain on the equity front, there needs to be a strong case indeed that
generally available income averaging would simplify matters
significantly or make the economy more efficient. Unfortunately, I
conclude in the fifth Part of the article that even a conceptually simple
averaging system is likely to be perceived as quite complicated and
that it is also likely to create several problems that could increase the
complexity of any real-world implementation of the system. In
5 Specifically, I endorse the proposal outlined in Lily L. Batchelder, Taxing the
Poor: Income Averaging Reconsidered, 40 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 395 (2003), discussed in
Part IV.D infra.
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particular, an averaging system would create an additional opening for
wasteful lobbying and tax planning that does not exist under an
annual income tax system. Furthermore, the most important potential
sources of simplification in Vickrey's system are not really based on
averaging at all and could be adopted on their own. Adopting them
separately from any plan for income averaging would, in fact,
probably be the best approach.
The efficiency analysis turns up results that also fail to support the
adoption of an averaging system for all taxpayers. After discussing
the ambiguous results from standard efficiency analysis, I summarize a
rather new and perhaps less familiar argument known as "winner-
take-all markets" that is based on a unique efficiency concern that
arises from the negative consequences of extreme income inequality.
Because the race for high incomes can distort people's decisions about
how to allocate their talents and efforts, I suggest that there might
even be an efficiency gain from keeping the current system of annual
taxation intact for temporary high earners, thus discouraging people
from focusing inappropriately on professions that might offer one-
shot gains that, by their very nature, can go only to the very lucky few.
I thus conclude that income averaging is not an appealing
template for tax reform and, therefore, that taxes should continue to
be computed on an annual basis. I would, however, allow lower
income citizens to elect a simple plan that would mitigate arbitrary tax
penalties that might otherwise flow from their uneven earnings
patterns. Progressivity and simplicity should remain central concerns
for tax reform, but income averaging (to say nothing of the full-scale
program of fundamental tax reform with cumulative lifetime
averaging that Vickrey recommended) is not a promising avenue
toward either goal.
While I use Vickrey's proposal for cumulative income averaging
as a starting point (and as something of a foil) in this article, the
argument here is about much more than his particular - and
particularly ambitious - averaging plan. The fundamental question is
whether the tax consequences of uneven earnings patterns should be
changed by adopting some form of generally-available income
averaging procedure. I would offer a limited averaging plan as a tool
to try to improve the lives of our least well-off citizens, but otherwise I
conclude that the case for averaging fails on the grounds of equity,
simplicity, and efficiency. In reaching that conclusion, I also
fundamentally question the importance of horizontal equity as a
primary concern of tax policy.
2006] 1157
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II. VICKREY, VALUES, AND TAX REFORM
A. In Memory of William Vickrey
In 1996, after a long and distinguished career as a public finance
economist, William Vickrey was awarded the Bank of Sweden Prize in
Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel,6 commonly known as
the Nobel Prize in Economics. Only a few days after learning that he
had been selected for this honor, he died while driving to an
8
economics conference. He was thus prevented from receiving his
prize in person and from enjoying the acclaim that would have come
with the award.
Prior to his death (and several months prior to his recognition by
the prize committee), I had the good fortune to speak privately with
Professor Vickrey about his body of work.9 During one conversation,
I took the opportunity to ask him a straightforward question: "Do you
wish that any of your work had had a greater impact than it has had?"
His answer was simple: "Yes, cumulative averaging." He noted that
6 Vickrey shared the prize with James Mirrlees. Press Release, Royal Swedish
Academy of Sciences, The Sweriges Riksbank (Bank of Sweden) Prize in Economic
Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel for 1996 (Oct. 8, 1996), available at
http://nobelprize.org/economics/laureates/1996/press.html (identifying Mirrlees and
Vickrey each as winners of one-half of the prize "for their fundamental contributions
to the economic theory of incentives under asymmetric information").
7 While commonly used, this term is not strictly correct. The Nobel Prizes are
separate and distinct from the economics award. The Nobel Prizes were first awarded
in 1901 and are called "The Nobel Peace Prize" and "The Nobel Prize in "
(Physics, Chemistry, Medicine, or Literature). See, e.g., The Nobel Prize in Physics,
http://nobelprize.org/physics. The economics award, on the other hand, was first
awarded in 1969 and carries the somewhat ungainly name noted in the text. For a
critique of the economics prize and an argument that the award should be abolished,
see Barbara Bergmann, Abolish the Nobel Prize for Economics - How Fair Is the
Nobel?, CHALLENGE, Mar.-Apr. 1999, at 52.
8 Janny Scott, After 3 Days in the Spotlight, Nobel Prize Winner is Dead, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 12, 1996, § 1, at 1.
9 This truly was a matter of good fortune. I had not been one of Vickrey's
students (indeed, my Ph.D. work was at Harvard rather than Columbia), nor was my
dissertation focused on the design of the tax system. I was at that point a resident
scholar at a small research institute, and I happened to meet Vickrey at a series of
conferences. I do not, therefore, pretend to be uniquely situated to discuss Vickrey's
"true views" or to have special insight into his mode of analysis. Rather, I took
seriously the points that he made to me, took note of his obvious passion on the
subject of his cumulative averaging system, and resolved that at some point I would
give his proposal a careful look.
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much of his earlier work no longer interested him and seemed rather
trivial, such as his work on auction theory, which was later mentioned
specifically in his award citation (and which is sometimes known by
the eponymous term Vickrey Auctions).1 ° Instead, he was most
keenly interested in macroeconomic issues and government debt
finance, especially as they related to the employment situation.
Even so, Vickrey continued to be intensely concerned with the
problem of tax reform. He spoke ruefully of the failure of the
economics profession and the policy community to take up his
cumulative averaging proposal, a proposal that he had first outlinedS 12
more than fifty years earlier. He provided me with a then-recent
unpublished manuscript outlining his current thinking on the
proposal.13 While this later paper covered a wide range of subjects,
cumulative averaging was the central policy proposal in that paper.
In a system of cumulative averaging, taxpayers would pay tax not
on their annual income but on their cumulative average incomes over
the course of their lifetimes. While I will outline the details of the full
Vickrey plan further below,14 it is helpful here to summarize the
proposal very briefly. Vickrey's plan would tax about 90 percent of all
taxpayers at a single rate, under what he called the "normal tax." The
highest income taxpayers would pay an additional, progressive surtax.
10 Press Release, The Sveriges Riksbank (Bank of Sweden) Prize in Economic
Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel for 1996 (Oct. 8, 1996), available at
http://nobelprize.org/economics/laureates/1996/press.html (describing the work for
which the winners of the prize were being honored, including Vickrey's work on
auctions).
1 William Vickrey, Meaningfully Defining Deficits and Debt, 82 AM. ECON.
REV. 305, 308 (1992) ("At present, resources of both labor and productive capacity
are woefully underutilized.").
12 William Vickrey, Averaging of Income for Income-Tax Purposes, 47 J. POL.
ECON. 379 (1939) [hereinafter Vickrey, Averaging of Income 1939]. The arguments in
this article were expanded and included as a chapter in WILLIAM VICKREY, AGENDA
FOR PROGRESSIVE TAXATION (1947) [hereinafter VICKREY, AGENDA 1947]. Vickrey
further discusses these issues in his later works. See William Vickrey, Tax
Simplification Through Cumulative Averaging, 34 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 736
(1969); William Vickrey, Cumulative Averaging After Thirty Years, in MODERN
FISCAL ISSUES: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF CARL S. SHOUP 117, 133 (Richard M. Bird and
John G. Head eds., 1972) [hereinafter Vickrey, After Thirty Years 1972]; William
Vickrey, An Updated Agenda for Progressive Taxation, 82 AM. ECON. REV. 257 (1992)
[hereinafter Vickrey, Updated Agenda 1992]; William Vickrey, Simplification,
Progression, and a Level Playing Field (Mar. 11, 1995) (unpublished manuscript, on
file with author) [hereinafter Vickrey, Level Playing Field 1995].
13 Vickrey, Level Playing Field 1995, supra note 12.
14 See infra Part II.B.
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Importantly, the surtax would be refundable if a person's subsequent
earning went down, with taxes (or refunds) in any given year being
determined by applying the tax rate schedule to each taxpayer's
average lifetime income to date.
The focus in this article, however, is not on the full-scale Vickrey
plan to replace the tax system entirely, but on the more limited (but
still quite rich) question of whether any system that makes income
averaging available to all taxpayers should be adopted in the United
States. Despite my great respect for Professor Vickrey and his
passionate advocacy of income averaging, I conclude that a general
system of income averaging seems unnecessary to the achievement of
either of his stated goals of progressivity or simplicity. I thus
tentatively conclude that income averaging would not be a wise policy
choice for the U.S. tax system, other than for low-income individuals.
B. The Goals and Effects of the Tax System
It is helpful here to return briefly to the fundamentals of tax
analysis, recalling the uses and effects of taxes on society and our
criteria in evaluating changes in the tax system. Because changing
from an annual tax accounting system to a system of income averaging
implicates these foundational issues, the starting point of analysis
should be to recall what we expect the tax system to do and why.
• • 15
The recent report by the president's tax reform commission is
only the latest event in an extended debate about the structure of the
U.S. tax system. Each new election campaign, it seems, brings
renewed calls to correct some fundamental flaw in the federal tax
system. 6 We are promised that changes in the tax system will lead to
greater simplicity, higher growth, enhanced international
competitiveness, and a host of other appealing economic goals.17
Clearly, though, these cannot be the only goals of tax reform - nor
should they even be presumptively the central focus of analysis.
Because the tax system is one of the most potent tools at the
disposal of any government, it should not be surprising that
15 See supra note 1.
16 For a good description of the basic tax plans that have been floated in the
United States over the last decade or so, see McNulty, supra note 3. Though
published in 2000, McNulty's article still covers all of the relevant territory in terms of
current tax reform proposals.
17 The purported macroeconomic benefits of tax reform are discussed critically
in Neil H. Buchanan, Taxes, Saving, and Macroeconomics, 33 J. ECON. ISSUES 59
(1999).
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governments use the tax system to try to achieve social goals large and
small. In the context of tax policy, no social ideal is more fundamental
than the hard-to-define and shifting concept of fairness. "We have a
procedure for deciding whether inequality is unjust, or how much is
unjust. It is called democracy. 1 8 Faith in democracy is based in part
on the belief that the people know best how to define the "good
society." While the concept of the good society is constantly
changing, some over-arching ideals can form the basis for evaluating
any change in government policy. "The social processes of a free
society are, if not infallible, the only reliable means to moral
truth . . .,,9
Even on such strictly economic issues as the definitions of income
and consumption and what should be taxed, the ethics of society and
its definition of fairness not only define what is acceptable but define
it differently in different situations. Unpaid labor provided at home,
for example, has thus far not been defined as income for the purpose
of calculating taxes, despite this being rather obviously a form of
income.
A recent political debate in the state of Utah nicely illustrates the
point. There, a politically conservative governor came into office in
early 2005 and immediately put the issue of state tax reform on the
table.20 With the so-called Flat Tax being a favored policy by many
conservatives, it appeared to some observers that a state-level flat tax
was a "slam dunk., 21 Because a pure flat tax system has no charitable
deductions, though, whereas the state's dominant Mormon church
"reiterated its 'support of retaining a state tax deduction for charitable
giving,"' 22 the political decision was clear: "There will not be a pure
flat tax in Utah [because] a flat tax with no deductions, exemptions or




As the editorialist describing the Utah debate summed it up:
"Here in Utah, good public policy is more than efficient policy. Good
public policy will actually reflect the values and priorities of the
people it serves., 24 One might well add that that is as true in every
other state as it is in Utah. It cannot be otherwise. The relative
18 Herbert Stein, Regarding Henry... WALL ST. J., Jan. 30, 1996, at A18.
19 Id. (quoting Henry Simons without citation).
20 Paul T. Mero, Editorial, In Utah, the Flat Tax Doesn't Have a Prayer, WALL







influence of different religious organizations, the variety of extant
belief systems (religious and otherwise), and different personal and
social priorities will lead to different outcomes in each debate, but the
issues are always framed by a full range of social goals and moral
concerns.
In this example, the values and priorities of the relevant
population are evidently not driven by concerns about progressivity
but about retaining the deduction for charitable contributions. Not all
communities will give tax progressivity the primacy that I advocate
here, but at least it is clear that moral values can and do strongly affect
tax policy debates and the decisions that arise from those debates.
It is very much the point of policy analysis to scrutinize these
social decisions and to suggest changes in the decisions that have been
made (in many cases implicitly and without debate). Moreover, it
would impoverish the analysis to start from the presumption that tax
policy's only goals should revolve around those efficiency-related
variables mentioned above (growth, international competitiveness,
etc.))5' Economic efficiency or prosperity cannot be the only goal of
tax policy. If the people, through their elected representatives, choose
to adopt a tax policy that is plainly inefficient, that is their right.26
In particular, it is always the case that changes in tax policy have
the intended or unintended effect of changing society, that is, of being
at least inadvertent acts of social engineering. Every definition of
income, every exclusion, every attempt to simplify the tax system,
involves choices as to what should be encouraged and what
discouraged. In this broad sense, therefore, we cannot have a neutral
tax system. The most honest way to evaluate proposed changes to a
tax system is to ask two questions: (1) What are you trying to socially
engineer? and (2) Are the trains running on time (i.e., are you a good
engineer)?
This article looks at normative concepts of fairness in the tax
code, as well as administrative efficiency (simplicity) and economic
efficiency. Regarding fairness, I (like Vickrey) embrace the notion of
25 See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
26 It is surely the case, in fact, that some of the most important public policy
decisions in our history have been made without reference to efficiency concerns. An
analysis of whether it was economically efficient to raise the national debt to fight
World War 11, which was fought against enemies that relied on private markets (the
Axis powers of Germany, Italy, and Japan) and with an ally that promoted global
communism (the Soviet Union) was never explicitly made, so far as I am aware.
Fascism was viewed as wrong; and political and economic decisions flowed from that
moral judgment.
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progressivity. As discussed further below, it is always important to
keep an eye on how the tax system affects the level of inequality in
society. The focus is on normative analysis, specifically because I
believe that normative concerns should be our first concern in any tax
reform - and because income averaging so surprisingly fails to
address serious normative concerns for all but the lowest income
taxpayers.
C. Full-Scale Versus Limited Tax Reform
Vickrey's proposal would completely replace the current U.S tax
system with his preferred ideal alternative. Full-scale plans for
fundamental tax reform have been widely discussed for a number of
years - though such plans are more often (but certainly not always)
advanced by those on the conservative side of the political aisle."27
Vickrey consciously advocated his cumulative averaging plan in the
years immediately preceding his death as a progressive alternative to
those plans: "[I]t is possible to achieve practical simplicity and a
reduction in perverse incentives to a far greater degree than under any
of the 'flat-rate' proposals being advanced, without significant
sacrifice of progressivity.
28
From this perspective, it is refreshing to consider a plan that
directly attempts to separate simplicity from flatness or from changing
the tax base. Vickrey makes the point that, for those who are willing
to take the leap and completely rewrite the tax code, there are
progressive alternatives. Indeed, on a panel discussing "Tax Reform
for Lower-Income Taxpayers" at the annual meetings of the
American Association of Law Schools, I started my remarks by
saying: "I am here to advocate something that I do not actually
believe in. 29  Explaining this seemingly self-negating statement, I
suggested that - even for one who is highly skeptical of the wisdom
of all-at-once tax reform - one could at least offer Vickrey's plan
arguendo, as something to put on the table, should large-scale reform
27 Two articles summarizing some of the politically prominent plans in the 1990s,
both of which criticize the plans themselves and question the wisdom of such root-
and-branch approaches to tax reform, are McNulty, supra note 3, and Neil H.
Buchanan, A User's Guide to Proposals to Replace the U.S. Tax System and Strangle
Fiscal Policy, 33 J. ECON. ISSUES 505 (1999) [hereinafter Buchanan, User's Guide].
28 Vickrey, Level Playing Field 1995, supra note 12, at 1.
29 Neil H. Buchanan, Progressive Income Taxation and the Vickrey Cumulative
Averaging System (Jan. 5, 2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author,
presented at Association of American Law Schools annual meeting in San Francisco




Ultimately, though, it is almost surely true that Vickrey's
full-scale plan for "[l]ifetime taxation is not a practical proposal."30
Moreover, as I have argued elsewhere, even if a pure system were put
in place, it would take no time at all for the system to be amended and
altered, perhaps beyond recognition.3 Talk of fundamental reform is
intellectually engaging, but at some point it becomes more important
to discuss realistic reforms. The remainder of this article, therefore, is
concerned not with Vickrey's proposal as a possible political platform
for a future presidential candidate but with income averaging as a
method to redress arguable inequities in the tax system.
III. TAXING AVERAGE INCOME
As noted above,3" the adoption of an annual system of tax
accounting inherently runs the risk of creating arbitrary and thus
horizontally inequitable results. Specifically, the problem flows from
the interaction of annual accounting periods with graduated rate
structures, potentially causing a taxpayer to pay a "tax penalty" (i.e.,
higher taxes than otherwise) merely because of the timing of his
income stream over the space of a few years. This potential problem
has long been recognized. In his landmark 1939 article, Vickrey could
fairly begin by noting that "[i]t has long been considered one of the
principal defects of the graduated individual income tax that
fluctuating incomes are.., subjected to much heavier tax burdens."33
Schmalbeck3 4 and Batchelder 35 provide stylized examples of the
consequences of being pushed into higher tax brackets temporarily.
Using rates and deductions relevant to the time when each article was
written, each provides examples that show that the penalty associated
with volatile income can be very large (Schmalbeck, showing that a
middle-income taxpayer can pay nearly sixty percent more in tax due
to income volatility than she would have paid otherwise) 36 or quite low
(Batchelder, showing a high-income taxpayer whose penalty from
having volatile income is to pay a one percent increase in her average
30 Batchelder, supra note 5, at 416.
31 Buchanan, User's Guide, supra note 27.
32 See supra pages preceding Part II.A.
33 Vickrey, Averaging of Income 1939, supra note 12, at 379 (emphasis added).
34 Richard Schmalbeck, Income Averaging After Twenty Years: A Failed
Experiment in Horizontal Equity, 1984 DUKE L.J. 509, 510.
35 Batchelder, supra note 5, at 406.
36 Schmalbeck, supra note 34, at 510.
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tax rate).37 Generating yet another such example here is beside the
point, so long as it is understood that a graduated rate structure can
have the effect of raising the total taxes paid by a taxpayer depending
on how smoothly her income stream is earned.
In Part III.A below, I describe the U.S. experience with income
averaging and the scholarly literature that has addressed the issue.
Part III.B then describes the full-scale cumulative averaging plan that
38Professor Vickrey described in his 1995 manuscript. After delving
into those details, Part III.C considers Vickrey's plan not in toto, but
by looking at the elements of the plan that are not necessarily logically
connected to income averaging. It turns out that one could achieve
many of Vickrey's apparent goals without necessarily endorsing the
core of his cumulative averaging income tax system.
A. Averaging in Practice and in the Scholarly Literature
Any system that bases its tax assessments on a finite accounting
period might generate results that seem arbitrary, because the
economic activity that is taxed continues across the arbitrary
boundary lines of time created by the tax system. When rates change
from year to year, of course, the results might be still more arbitrary.
This fundamental issue is, therefore, hardly a modern creation or
discovery. Almost as soon as an arbitrary line is drawn, we will be
confronted with the consequences of policing such a line.
Shortly after the adoption of the original Internal Revenue Code
(Code), the U.S. Supreme Court was asked to address an unintended
consequence of annual accounting. In Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks
Co.,39 the Court considered the case of a taxpayer who had lost money
in several years and later recovered through suit an amount in excess
of its previous losses. The taxpayer contended that, in essence, the
U.S. income tax system was intended to impose taxes on profitable
transactions of companies, not on annual profits. By that logic, the
company should have been allowed to go back in time and offset gains
in one year with losses in another, so long as the gains and losses were
related to the same transaction. Rejecting that argument, the Court
stated that, even if the net result of combining two years into a single
taxable period would show a loss for the company, "it has never been
37 Batchelder, supra note 5, at 406 (referring to id. at 405 tbl.1, which
demonstrates a one percent increase in the taxpayer's average tax rate due to having
earned $200,000 one year and $100,000 the next, rather than $150,000 each year).
38 Vickrey, Level Playing Field 1995, supra note 12.
39 282 U.S. 359 (1931).
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supposed that that fact would relieve him of tax on the first [year's
income], or that it affords any reason for postponing the assessment of
the tax until the end of a lifetime, or for some other indefinite
period. 40 Since the Congress that enacted the tax code was aware
that the common practice in income tax systems was to tax on an
annual basis, the Court could not conclude that Congress intended
otherwise when it created an income tax for the United States.4'
Since Sanford & Brooks was decided, Congress has taken up the
Court's invitation and attempted to mitigate the effects of annual
accounting in a number of ad hoc ways, a few of which I summarize
here.
1. Attempts to Create Limited Relief in the Code
The current tax code includes several provisions that break with
the logic enunciated in Sanford & Brooks by allowing taxpayers to
take advantage of losses in one year to offset gains in another.
Section 172 allows individual taxpayers to carry forward or carry
backward net operating losses of a business (for twenty years and two
years, respectively).4 ' This section was created to "ameliorate the
unduly drastic consequences of taxing income strictly on an annual
basis." 3 Capital losses may also be carried over.44
The "tax benefit rule" allows a taxpayer who has not taken
advantage of a tax deduction (and can no longer do so) to avoid
paying taxes on a subsequent recovery.45  This rule is highly
incomplete in providing relief, however, because it only protects
taxpayers who have received zero benefit from a deduction. If a
taxpayer has received any reduction at all in taxes due in one year, it
could still be required to pay taxes at a higher rate in a subsequent
46
year.
These limited examples demonstrate that Congress has not
systematically undermined the basic annual accounting framework in
the current tax code. At one point, however, Congress did enact a
system of limited income averaging.47  Richard Schmalbeck's
40 Id. at 365.
41 Id.
42 I.R.C. § 172.
43 United States v. Foster Lumber Co., 429 U.S. 32., 42 (1976).
I.R.C. § 1212.
45 I.R.C. § 111.
WILLIAM A. KLEIN ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 139 (14th ed. 2006).
47 I.R.C. 88 1301-05 (1954) (repealed 1986).
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landmark article discussing that ill-fated system was actually written in
advance of the law's repeal,48 though the question of whether his
article was the direct cause of the law's demise is certainly open to
speculation. Schmalbeck describes the various provisions of the now-
repealed averaging system in admirable (one might even say
excruciating) detail, noting inter alia that the system was originally set
41up to allow taxpayers to average income over the previous four years
(later reduced to three years0) and that the system did not permit
taxpayers to take advantage of averaging when income declined."
As Schmalbeck notes, though, "it is extremely difficult to describe
the income averaging computations accurately without falling into the
soporific syntax of the instructions found on tax forms: Take the
excess of this over twice the amount of that, and multiply the result by
some other apparently arbitrary amount."52 Learning now whether,
for example, nonresident aliens were eligible to elect income
averaging" would serve as an unnecessary distraction. Fortunately, it
is necessary to note here only that the system that existed from 1964
to 1986 was clearly not the lifetime cumulative averaging system that
Vickrey envisioned, nor was it a benchmark for any more generalized
averaging system. It is worth noting, however, that our one major
real-world attempt to introduce even a limited form of averaging for
all taxpayers was quite messy and was ultimately repealed.
2. Vickrey and the Tax Policy Literature
As noted in the introduction to this article, Vickrey was deeply
disappointed that his cumulative averaging proposal did not capture
the imaginations of the academic and political communities. An
article that he wrote a few years before his death began: "Since the
publication of the Agenda [for Progressive Taxation] in 1947,
remarkably little of its recommendations have seen
implementation .... While many of the original recommendations
48 Schmalbeck, supra note 34.
49 Id. at 510.
'0 Id. at 578.
" Id. at 510 (stating that the law defines "averagable income" as the amount by
which taxable income in the computation year exceeds thirty percent of total income
in the base period); id. at 577 (arguing that "Congress should.., make averaging
available when a taxpayer's income declines").
52 Id. at 512.
51 Id. at 519 (they were not eligible).
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remain valid, new circumstances call for a fresh look.,
4
Vickrey's assessment of his proposal's unpopularity appears to
have been largely accurate. As Batchelder notes: "Few scholars have
systematically analyzed the merits of taxation of lifetime income
relative to the annual perspective," noting only two such pieces over
the previous fifty years.55 Even broadening a search in the legal
literature56 to find articles that refer to Vickrey's landmark 1939S 51
article on cumulative averaging or to his 1947 book on progressive
taxation5 8 reveals a relatively small number of citations. Moreover,
these citations to Vickrey's work often refer to some other topic
entirely,' 9 mention averaging briefly in the context of discussing a
60 61
related topic,6° or contrast it with the subject of the author's interest.
The commentators who deal most directly with the essence of
Vickrey's approach include Soled, who argues for a two-year period of
taxation, rather than one,62 Shakow, who discusses cumulative
. Vickrey, Updated Agenda 1992, supra note 12, at 257.
55 Batchelder, supra note 5, at 399 (citing Schmalbeck, supra note 34, and Wilbur
A. Steger, On the Theoretical Equity of an Averaging Concept for Income Tax
Purposes, 13 TAx L. REV. 211 (1958)).
56 The search was limited by the coverage of the database to articles published
since 1980.
57 Ten articles cited Vickrey, Averaging of Income 1939, supra note 12. The full
list is on file with the author. Individual articles mentioned in the text are footnoted
below.
58 Forty-six articles cited VICKREY, AGENDA 1947, supra note 12. The full list is
on file with the author. Individual articles mentioned in the text are footnoted below.
59 See, e.g., William T. Mathias, Curtailing the Economic Distortions of the
Mortgage Interest Deduction, 30 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 43, 54 (1996) (citing Vickrey
for the proposition that "pure free-market economists argue that government
preferences for home ownership lead citizens to divert resources from their most
productive uses, thereby reducing economic efficiency and retarding economic
growth").
60 See, e.g., Stephen B. Land, Defeating Deferral: A Proposal for Retrospective
Taxation, 52 TAX L. REV. 45, 62-64 (1996) (referring to Vickrey's lifetime averaging
system in the course of discussing "accrual on debt instruments"); see also David M.
Schizer, Realization As Subsidy, 73 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1549, 1596-97 (1998) (mentioning
Vickrey among a group of authors who have proposed charging interest on taxes
deferred due to the realization requirement).
61 Noel B. Cunningham, Commentary Observations on Retrospective Taxation,
53 TAX L. REV. 489, 490 n.16 (2000) (citing Vickrey's averaging plan as a method of
retrospective taxation that is an alternative to "most methods," which "deal solely
with assumed gains... ").
62 Jay A. Soled, A Proposal To Lengthen the Tax Accounting Period, 14 AM. J.
TAX POL'Y 35 (1997).
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S63averaging at length in an article advocating accrual taxation,
Batchelder, whose work is discussed below,64 and McCaffery, who
spends several pages comparing and contrasting his proposal for a
progressive postpaid consumption tax with Vickrey's cumulative
averaging plan.65
In addition to these published works, several relevant
unpublished articles have circulated recently. Liebman derives
theoretical conditions under which cumulative taxation could increase
social well-being. 66 Fennell and Stark offer a careful analysis of
61Vickrey's cumulative averaging proposal, followed by their own
alternative proposal of a system of "age-based taxation," which
61adjusts the tax rate structure to take account of age.
Finally, Schlunk proposed a lifetime averaging system for a
unique purpose: allowing taxpayers to borrow less money in private
markets by shifting their borrowing to the government, which can
borrow at lower rates. Thus, even if the taxpayers ultimately
reimburse the government for its borrowing costs, they are better off
69by the amount of the lower interest payments. While an interesting
proposal, Schlunk's focus is clearly not on the same issues that
motivated Vickrey.0
63 David J. Shakow, Taxation Without Realization: A Proposal for Accrual
Taxation, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1111 (1986).
64 Batchelder, supra note 5, discussed infra Part V.
65 Edward J. McCaffery, A New Understanding of Tax, 103 MICH. L. REV. 807,
880-84 (2005).
66 Jeffrey Liebman, Should Taxes Be Based on Lifetime Income? Vickrey
Taxation Revisited (Feb. 27, 2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
67 Lee Anne Fennell & Kirk J. Stark, Taxation Over Time, 59 TAx L. REV.
(forthcoming 2006) (manuscript at 23-32, on file with author), available at
http://www.law.nyu.edu/colloquia/taxpolicy/papers/06/LeeFennell.pdf.
68 Id. at 32-55. In particular, see id. at 32 ("Age-based taxes take an entirely
different approach to the problem of taxation over time than do lifetime averaging
proposals. Instead of seeking to effectively level out peaks and valleys in earning
patterns, age-based taxes attempt to consciously exploit systemic life cycle
patterns .. ") and id. at 33 ("Our analysis focuses on a more fundamental alteration
of the tax rate structure to take account of age.").
69 Herwig J. Schlunk, A Lifetime Income Tax (Vanderbilt Univ. Law Sch. Law &
Econ. Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 05-07, 2005), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=668942. In particular, see id. at 2-4.
70 Id. at 30 ("This paper is not directly concerned with the detrimental effects
that a progressive income tax regime can have on taxpaying units with wildly
fluctuating incomes."). Schlunk does go on to examine an example of a taxpayer with
a volatile income stream, but he concludes that the benefit from the government's
lower-cost borrowing is likely to be more important even to a volatile-income
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It thus seems fair to say that Vickrey was right in concluding that
his plan for cumulative averaging garnered little support - and
apparently no unqualified support - and that this situation continues
to this day. Schmalbeck and Batchelder deal most centrally with the
concept of income averaging in the sense that Vickrey discussed it, but
each author rejects to a significant degree Vickrey's policy stance.
The article that you are now reading, it is fair to say, also falls into that
category.
B. The Vickrey Plan
In describing Vickrey's cumulative averaging proposal here, I do
not identify specific tax rates or other institutional details, because
those details are not the focus of this (or Vickrey's) analysis. For the
occasional example, I use specific rates and other details only for
illustrative purposes. I also focus on the personal tax side of Vickrey's
system, not on the corporate side.
Under the Vickrey plan, the personal income tax system would
have two parts. First, everyone would pay a "normal tax,",71 which
would be applied to all income below a maximum threshold at a single
low rate.7' The normal tax would be withheld from people's
paychecks as well as from interest payments from banks, dividends on
stock, etc. 7 a This would not require the filing of any individual tax
returns. People would tell their employer how many exemptions they
qualify for (similar to the current form that everyone fills out on the"o "74
first day in a new job),7 but otherwise they would not have to deal
personally with income taxes at all.
Vickrey suggested that the normal tax rate should be kept
constant over time, "to avoid pesky problems as to which yearly rate
should be applied to a given payment. 75 If the government needed to
raise more revenue, it could change personal allowances or raise the
surtax rate, which (as explained immediately below) is paid only by
the highest-income taxpayers.76
The second part of the Vickrey system, the "surtax," is a
progressive-rate tax system applied above a certain annual average
taxpayer than any benefits from smoothing tax liabilities. See id. at 35.
71 Vickrey, Level Playing Field 1995, supra note 12, at 1.
72 Id.
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income level,7 7 with the cutoff set so that it would apply only to about
ten percent or less of taxpayers. 8 Vickrey argued that the additional
record-keeping required by this system (compared to the current
system) would be trivial, involving nothing more than carrying over
cumulative lifetime income and taxes paid from the previous year's
tax return to the current year.79 The surtax would then be cumulative,
such that taxpayers would only pay the surtax if their average income
to date was above the cut-off point.
Importantly, the Vickrey surtax would be refundable, rebating
80taxes paid if a taxpayer's average income fell below the cut-off point.
In that way, the system acts like a "wage insurance" plan. For
example, suppose that the average annual income cut-off for the
surtax was $100,000. If a person earned $450,000 per year every year,
then he or she would pay the surtax every year on $350,000 of income.
But if the taxpayer earned $450,000 in year one and $50,000 every
year after that, then they would not only pay no surtax after year one
but would also receive a refund of part of the first year's surtax every
year based on average income, until average income reached the
cut-off point, which would mean that the taxpayer would have paid
only ten percent of lifetime income in taxes. Vickrey argued that this
system would be administratively much simpler than the current
system for the vast majority of the population, that it would be
progressive, and that it would smooth out swings in income."
As noted, the focus of this article is not on the details of Vickrey's
full-scale proposal but on income averaging alone, without the overlay
of normal taxes and surtaxes or other details such as who must fill out
income tax returns. Even so, it is worth noting that Vickrey's plan
would apply a single rate under the normal tax system to ninety
82percent or more of all taxpayers. If progressivity is good, why is it
only good above a certain income level? It is certainly true that there
are compelling arguments for having someone with income of
$600,000 pay a higher rate than someone who makes $60,000,83 but if
77 Id. at 4.
78 Id.
79 Id. at 5.
80 Id.
81 Vickrey, Averaging of Income 1939, supra note 12, at 397; Vickrey, Level
Playing Field 1995, supra note 12, at 1.
82 Vickrey, Level Playing Field 1995, supra note 12, at 4.
83 The arguments here do not turn on whether we are discussing annual income
or average income, so long as all numerical examples are understood to be measured
consistently.
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the income cut-off for the surtax were, say, $120,000 in Vickrey's
system, why are we comfortable having someone with $120,000 in
income pay tax at the same normal rate as someone with $40,000 in
income? Especially because we are now thinking about much larger
numbers of taxpayers, this seems an odd choice in that it would
require lower-middle-class taxpayers to pay taxes at the same rate as
those at the upper end of the middle-class.4 Although I note below
that the arguments for progressivity are less compelling with smaller
income differences and that this might be a reason not to be
particularly concerned about the inadvertent horizontal inequities
potentially caused by an annual income tax system with progressive
rates, it is nevertheless odd to think of designing a tax system
deliberately from the start to be proportional over the vast majority of
the population.
Vickrey's indirect response to this argument is that simplicity
trumps progressivity: "The total number of returns to be processed by
the IRS would be reduced by 60 to 80 percent."85  While such
tradeoffs are matters of judgment, it seems at least worth questioning
the choice to simplify the system by taxing the near-poor and the
upper middle class at the same rate. The idea of fewer people filling
out tax forms is, of course, appealing, but at what cost to equity?
86
C. Non-Averaging Aspects of Vickrey's Proposal
Vickrey's plan is interesting and certainly not often discussed in
policy circles. Given that Vickrey put so much emphasis on the
simplification that would be achieved by his system, though, it is
notable that averaging is not what he identified as the principal source
of simplification in his system. "The real simplification comes from
the fact that the ultimate burden on the taxpayer is largely
independent of the time at which he reports income.""' Why?
84 Cf Start Making Sense, http://danshaviro.blogspot.com/2005/06/aei-tax-
reform-panel.html (June 7, 2005, 14:31 EST) (weblog entry by Daniel N. Shaviro,
discussing proposal in Michael J. Graetz, 100 Million Unnecessary Returns: A Fresh
Start for the U.S. Tax System, 112 YALE L.J. 261 (2002), describing a "dilemma
resulting from the basic tradeoff between good distributional results and low-end
simplification").
85 Vickrey, Level Playing Field 1995, supra note 12, at 4.
On the other hand, it is at least true that a single rate in the normal tax range
eliminates the penalty for income volatility within that range. Receiving taxable
income of $100,000 one year and $50,000 the next would result in exactly the same tax
payments as receiving $75,000 for both years.
Vickrey, Level Playing Field 1995, supra note 12, at 5-6.
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Because Vickrey would continue to allow taxpayers to defer tax
payments on gains until realization events occurred, but they would be
required to pay interest on the unpaid taxes. "Provided only that all
income accruals (including capital gains and losses) are eventually
brought to account.., deferral of the realization or reporting of
income becomes merely a borrowing of the corresponding tax at an
appropriate rate of interest." 8 Vickrey even suggests that the rate of
interest can become a policy tool, whereby lowering the rate at which
taxpayers "borrow" their unpaid taxes from the government would act
like a tax cut.89
Vickrey argued that, because of this "real simplification" of the
tax system, "some two-thirds of the internal revenue code would
become redundant." 90 This suggests that a large part of Vickrey's
proposed benefits derive not from his normal tax/surtax arrangement
nor from averaging income for tax purposes but from the requirement
that nonrealized tax obligations be charged interest. This idea may
well have merit, but it does not require anything as large-scale as
Vickrey proposes - nor even the adoption of income averaging at
all.91
Similarly, Vickrey proposes to improve the tax system by
broadening the income tax base. As he notes, "it is necessary to
eliminate many of the bells and whistles that confer benefits on
selected constituencies, and to refrain from attempts to use the
income tax as a device to encourage particular activities., 92 That is an
outcome for which we can all fervently hope, but the advantage again
comes not from income averaging nor from the normal tax/surtax
approach. Instead, it would arise from a sudden onset of conscience,
restraint, and responsibility on the part of Congress.
The larger point here is that the various elements of the Vickrey
system are severable. Base broadening is appealing on its own merits.
Better treatment of timing issues is appealing as well. Either or both
can be enacted now or in the future, whether or not income averaging
or the rest of the Vickrey package become part of the policy debate.
This is fortunate, given that the analysis below ultimately rejects the
income averaging aspect of Vickrey's proposal. While averaging
88 Id. at 3.
89 Id. at 6.
90 Id.
91 Indeed, this is the context in which Schizer cited Vickrey. See Schizer, supra
note 60, at 1596. Schizer points out that a number of other authors have proposed
similar interest-charging approaches on unrealized gains.
92 Vickrey, Level Playing Field 1995, supra note 12, at 1.
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might have been the heart of the plan in Vickrey's view, that need not
stop us from adopting appealing proposals that are severable from the
whole plan and separate from income averaging.
IV. EQUITY AND INCOME AVERAGING
As noted earlier, one conclusion of this article is that the Vickrey
system of cumulative income averaging is not a desirable alternative
for tax reform. More generally, income averaging alone, even without
the rest of the Vickrey apparatus, is not attractive except for the lower
end of the income spectrum. I should note that I reached this
conclusion somewhat by surprise. In 2004, when I reflected upon my
earlier conversations with Professor Vickrey and decided to pursue his
invitation to investigate cumulative averaging, I did so expecting to be
an advocate of his proposal, not a critic. Indeed, as noted earlier,
when I presented some preliminary thoughts that ultimately led to the
writing of this article, I argued in favor of adopting a system of
cumulative averaging in my presentation on the Tax Section panel at
the annual meeting of the American Association of Law Schools. 93
Despite this predisposition in favor of income averaging, it
ultimately became clear that the arguments in favor of the system
were either unconvincing or weaker than the arguments against it. As
I argue below, the ultimate policy concern that cumulative averaging
addresses (the unequal effective tax rates faced by those with volatile
incomes, compared to those with stable incomes) is not sufficiently
serious to justify a change in the basic method of computing taxable
income.94 The apparent horizontal inequity of such an outcome might
seem somewhat regrettable when viewed in isolation, but as an
argument for changing the accounting period used in our income tax
system, it falls far short of compelling.
The issue in any tax reform, after all, is not: "How would we
design a system from scratch?" but: "Given the trade-offs, is it worth
trying to change the current system to achieve a specific goal or
goals?" We are never writing on a blank slate. "[W]e never face
issues of tax design, but rather always issues of tax reform." 95 Without
a clear and compelling case that there is a basic injustice (or
inefficiency, or some other important defect) in the current system
93 See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
94 See infra Part IV.B, D.
95 LIAM MURPHY & THOMAS NAGEL, THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP 128 (2002)
(paraphrasing Martin Feldstein, On the Theory of Tax Reform, 6 J. PUB. ECON. 77
(1976)).
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that must be redressed, any problems of transition - and any
complications in the design of the proposal itself - loom very large.
This should not, however, be read to impose on tax policy analysis
a bias in favor of the status quo. It is true that any reasonable analyst
should be careful to consider the transition and revenue
considerations of tax policies, but these issues are surely not
presumptively strong enough to inevitably overcome any other
concerns - especially normative concerns - that are appropriately
raised in a policy debate. My conclusions here are driven by the belief
that our most appropriate policy concern should not be about people
with high average incomes who happen to earn those incomes in a
volatile fashion but about people at the bottom of society. A policy
proposal that would improve the lives of those who most need it
would have much to commend it, even when weighed against
transition and revenue effects.
Therefore, this Part explains why the case that there is a
fundamental injustice in the current system is relatively weak, as a
threshold issue. I conclude that whatever merits might be associated
with income averaging, there is ultimately not a strong case to adopt it
for all taxpayers. Instead, a very limited averaging system for the
lowest-earning taxpayers would address the most pressing normative
concerns. In the subsequent Part, I then describe some
complications that would come with the adoption of income
averaging, suggesting that even if we ignore the threshold issue of the
desirability of cumulative averaging as an ethical matter, the system
might become too complicated to be a viable alternative even to the
current system, administratively and certainly politically.
A. Revenue Neutrality
To discipline the analysis, it is important to recall that any attempt
to fix the perceived inequity of an annual tax accounting system will
simultaneously affect tax revenues. If we allow people to average
their incomes but we do not simultaneously change tax rates (or at
least change some aspect of the Code that affects revenues, such as
deductions and exclusions), those with volatile earnings will pay less in
taxes, while those with smooth incomes will pay the same as they
would have paid under annual taxation. The net result is a decline in
annual tax revenues.




If we are willing to collect less revenue, though, we are
acknowledging that we are currently collecting more income than we
need. If so, then we should have decreased taxes in any case, even if
there were no taxpayers at all who earned their incomes in an uneven
pattern. The choice to decrease tax collections by adopting an
averaging system, therefore, will prevent us from providing tax relief
through any other means, such as reducing tax rates or offering
targeted relief to other groups of taxpayers. Adopting an averaging
system, therefore, would necessarily involve some taxpayers paying
more tax than they would otherwise pay, even if we do not explicitly
raise tax rates.
Suppose, though, that we did not think that we were collecting too
little revenue before we discovered the problem that Vickrey
identified, but we concluded that our new knowledge of the
averaging-related inequity justified a decision to decrease tax
collections and thus increase the fiscal deficit. This does not change
the analysis, because we would still be saying that we are now willing
to tolerate a higher fiscal deficit in order to provide tax relief to a
certain group of taxpayers. We would still need to justify why it is the
volatile earners who are at the top of the priority list in meriting tax
relief.
The baseline assumption, therefore, in the analysis below is that
any attempt to provide tax relief for volatile earners through adoption
of a system of averaging must come at someone's expense. This is the
familiar "revenue neutrality" assumption, whereby we assume that the
amount of tax revenue currently being collected is the amount that we
would like to collect, and any changes that reduce taxes in one part of
the system must be balanced by changes elsewhere.
Perhaps the easiest way to conceptualize revenue neutrality is to
assume that any targeted tax reductions will be offset by system-wide
proportional increase in tax rates. If the targeted reduction is small,
of course, then the increase in rates will not be large; but there must
be at least some increase in rates. As I will discuss below, there are
situations in which we could imagine making up the revenue through
targeted increases, which would make broader increases unnecessary.
For example, we could decide to give low-income volatile earners a
break by raising rates on other low-income earners or by raising rates
on higher-income earners. Making such choices raises both horizontal
and vertical equity issues. The point, though, is that someone pays
more when someone else pays less.
This approach might seem to put a rather strict conceptual
straitjacket on any tax analysis. Imagine, for example, that instead of
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an arguable inequity such as the tax penalty on volatile income
earners, we discovered that some obscure provisions buried in a
recent tax bill had completely arbitrarily raised the tax bill for exactly
one taxpayer. Surely, if we agreed that this citizen's higher tax burden
was an error, we would readily agree to a technical correction to
delete the offending provision of the tax code. Why complicate the
analysis with talk of "tax increases" for other people?
Even in this extreme case, though, revenue neutrality provides the
most sensible approach, because either we must make up for the
decreased revenue elsewhere or we must do without. If we raise
revenue elsewhere, we will do so because we believe that we all
should share in alleviating the unfair burden mistakenly imposed on
this one taxpayer. If we do without, we might well do so because we
agree that purely unintentional tax penalties are perverse and should
not be allowed - so, even if there are other high priorities for tax
reductions, continued respect for the tax system will be undermined if
we do not correct such purely arbitrary treatment. Either way,
though, we must make choices about whether and how to respond to a
perceived inequity.
Such a discussion, as noted, raises concerns of vertical as well as
horizontal equity. In an attempt to isolate the horizontal equity issue,
Liebman discusses a concept called "distributional neutrality," in
which the adoption of a system of averaging would not shift tax
burdens vertically but would continue to tax "everyone at a given
level of lifetime income at the average of the lifetime tax currently
paid by people at that level of lifetime income. [This] approach
obviates the need to make judgements [sic] about the desirability of
redistribution across lifetime income levels."97
While useful for Liebman's purposes, distributional neutrality is
most definitely not appropriate as the basic standard for the
discussion here. The point, after all, is to determine whether we want
to change the system in response to an arguable inequity that might
well affect only certain categories of taxpayers. If we learn that our
failure to adopt averaging harms low-income people exclusively (or
principally), then we might well want to fix that problem in a way that
shifts the tax burden not onto other poor taxpayers but onto higher-
income taxpayers. Indeed, I will argue explicitly for that outcome.
Liebman, supra note 66, at 25.
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B. Horizontal Equity
Horizontal equity is the familiar requirement that we "treat likes
alike." The intuition behind the goal of horizontal equity is quite
powerful. Indeed, it is the basis for the reliance on precedent in
judicial decision-making. If two people do the same thing but are
treated differently, it had better be because they are somehow
different.98
Of course, the role of a lawyer is to explore the contours of "like
treatment" and who is "alike" in the first place. When Schmalbeck
wrote that "[h]orizontal equity demands that taxpayers who have
equal incomes be taxed equally,"" therefore, he overstated the case
(or under-described the facts). It is not equal incomes alone that
require equal taxation; and even if the issue were limited to equal
incomes, that still leaves open the question that is fundamental to
Vickrey's equity concern, i.e., incomes over what time period? As
Schmalbeck went on to explain: "Definitions of horizontal equity are
typically vague concerning the period over which it is to be gauged.
The principle is simply that 'similarly situated people should be
treated similarly, that equals should be treated equally."'
1°
Vickrey argued, in fact, that we should care about horizontal
inequity because of the ability-to-pay concept that is the essence of
vertical equity. "It is an obvious extension of the principle of taxation
according to ability to pay that no taxpayer should bear a heavier or
lighter burden merely because certain items of his income happen to
be earned or realized in one year or another."101  As I will
demonstrate below, this argument begs the question of whether
uneven earnings streams should be viewed as "the same" as smooth
earnings streams simply because they add up to the same total over
time. Vickrey is correct, though, to suggest that the argument for
horizontal equity in taxation gains moral force when it is tied to the
arguments pertaining to vertical equity.
98 Even young children exhibit a strong sense of fairness based on horizontal
equity. Siblings complain when other siblings are perceived to receive special
treatment, such as being given a later bedtime at a similar age.
99 Schmalbeck, supra note 34, at 509.
100 Id. at 547 (quoting WILLIAM A. KLEIN, POLICY ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL
INCOME TAX 7 (1976)).
101 Vickrey, Averaging of Income 1939, supra note 12, at 381.
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1. When is Averaging the Appropriate System of Taxation?
Suppose that a person knows that his or her job is secure and that
the employer insists on paying alternately $20,000 one year and
$180,000 the next, for the next forty years until retirement (with
inflation adjustments). Clearly, people in such a position could be
justified in viewing themselves as $100,000 per year earners. If the tax
system penalizes this earnings pattern, of course, they would also be
justified in asking their employer to change the pattern, but for
present purposes we can assume that the employer refuses.
In this highly stylized case, what is necessary to view this earner as
being "like" someone who earns $100,000 per year throughout their
lifetime? The answer is not obvious, unless one simply asserts that
multi-year analysis is the right way to view the situation and that the
annual method is the wrong way. It is possible, after all, that people
with volatile earnings do not view themselves as $100,000 per year
earners and do not act as if they do. In the extreme, they might simply
go from year to year, never noticing that their earnings pattern is
predictable. In such a case, they can live well one year and badly the
next. If they are sufficiently forward-looking, though, after an initial
period of adjustment they could simply save in the good years and
consume out of savings in the bad years, smoothing out consumption
to mimic someone who earns approximately $100,000 each year.
This example is, of course, rigged to make it seem all but certain
that even mildly rational people would soon treat themselves as
earning $100,000 per year. What about a person who is likely to earn
$20,000 for twenty years and $180,000 for the following twenty years?
Even if they were so inclined, could they treat themselves as if they
were earning their average income rather than their current income?
Fennell and Stark note that "cognitive factors and capital market
imperfections" will have important effects on the ability of such
people to treat themselves as $100,000 per year earners.102
In general, the more cognitive biases a person exhibits (myopia,
etc.), and the more incomplete and imperfect the financial markets
are (e.g., some taxpayers being unable to get loans at nonusurious
rates), the less likely they are to view lifetime income as relevant to
their decision making - and the less important is the horizontal
equity issue raised by volatile income streams. Schmalbeck concludes
that "there are powerful arguments for the annual view. This is
particularly the case in situations where the taxpayer does not
102 Fennell & Stark, supra note 67, at 31.
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anticipate the change in income."' 0 3
In addition to the question of how volatile earners view
themselves, there is the even more basic question of how many
volatile earners there are. Fennell and Stark somewhat misstate the
case when the say that "individuals with identical lifetime incomes will
often bear substantially different tax burdens depending on how that
income is divided among the several taxable years."' 4  Their
supporting quotation from Vickrey's 1939 article makes no mention of
the empirical frequency of the phenomenon, only describing it as a
logical possibility arising under an annual system with graduated
rates. Probably the best interpretation of the phrase "will often
bear" in that context, therefore, is "could conceivably bear."
In any case, Batchelder provides evidence regarding the
frequency and significance of income volatility. As discussed below,
she finds that the phenomenon is not widespread (although it has
increased recently) and that income volatility's impact on tax
outcomes hits low-income taxpayers much harder than those in other
income classes.' 6  The normative concern with the poor that I
emphasize in this article, therefore, aligns with the empirical reality of
who is being most harmed by paying taxes on annual incomes.
2. The Moral Significance of the Horizontal Equity Problem
The question of equity, then, comes back to the question of who is
"like" whom. If people earning $180,000 in a year think of themselves
as being in that income class, and if others think of them as being in
that income class, then it will seem inequitable to treat them like a
$100,000 annual earner. Indeed, doing so would itself be perceived as
inequitable, because in a given year different people who earn
$180,000 would pay different tax bills. "Thus, movement toward
horizontal equity between two taxpayers of equal lifetime incomes
makes the system less horizontally equitable for pairs of taxpayers
with the same annual incomes."'0 7
In other words, the question of who is alike for tax purposes has
no right answer. From an annual perspective, taxing average income
leads to horizontal inequity, while from a multi-year perspective,
103 Schmalbeck, supra note 34, at 547-48.
104 Fennell & Stark, supra note 67, at 24 (emphasis added).
105 Id. at 24 n.95 (quoting Vickrey, Averaging of Income 1939, supra note 12, at
379).
10 Batchelder, supra note 5, at 411-19. See especially id. at 415.
107 Schmalbeck, supra note 34, at 547.
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taxing annual income leads to horizontal inequity for the same
reasons. To take a more extreme example, is a person who earns
$64,000 per year for forty years "like" someone who earns $40,000 for
thirty-nine of those forty years and $1,000,000 for one year sometime
during that time period, such that they should both pay the same
(interest-adjusted) amount in taxes? Certainly a case can be made
that the person who received a million dollars in one year is unlike the
other person in very important ways; but the point is merely that it is
not presumptively the case that average incomes are superior to
annual incomes in judging horizontal equity.
The moral case for addressing purported horizontal equity by
adopting income averaging, therefore, does not upon examination
appear to be presumptively strong. Two people who earn similar
amounts over many years but who pay different tax rates might well
differ in important ways that make the significance of their different
average tax payments seem less arbitrary (and many might be able to
mitigate those effects through self-help, as discussed in Part IV.D.1
below). Therefore, even if we know that two people who earn similar
amounts over the space of several years pay different amounts in
taxes, we have to ask whether the gain from addressing that concern is
morally significant. As a general horizontal matter, I do not think that
it is.
Does this mean that we should completely ignore horizontal
equity as a policy concern? To take an extreme case, would it make
no difference at all if Bill Gates and Warren Buffett (to the extent that
these fabulously wealthy men receive similar levels of income over
time and are otherwise alike in ways that are broadly accepted as
meaningful) paid significantly different tax bills? One answer is that
failing to tax one of these men at the higher rate implies a loss of
revenue, which means that we are missing out on an opportunity to
have a revenue-neutral tax change that could help middle and lower-
income earners. Other than that, though, the moral outrage
generated by vertical inequities that I describe in Part IV.C below is
simply missing from the analysis of horizontal inequities.
3. The Costs and Benefits of Adopting an Averaging Plan
Of course, even a mild moral case for treating likes alike will be
compelling if there is no cost to addressing a horizontal inequity. The
point here is not that we would have no reason at all to address
horizontal inequities in the abstract but instead that any costs
associated with addressing this kind of horizontal inequity (if, again, it
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is even viewed as treating likes not alike) are likely to tip the scales
against the change.
What might those costs include? The most obvious are the
political difficulties associated with getting any tax change enacted.
Senator Charles Grassley, the current chair of the Senate Finance
Committee, once noted the difficulties raised by the requirement to
find offsetting changes to revenue losses created by Treasury
regulations:
I have had the experience myself of having to get corrective
legislation through.... [T]hose of us who want to [pass
corrective legislation are faced with] not only getting the bill
written, finding all of the cosponsors that one needs, but also,
then, when you actually get to the point of offering the
amendment, you have to come up with an offset.
While Grassley's concerns were in part motivated by a legally-
imposed requirement of literal revenue neutrality, he also makes clear
that it is hardly a simple process to pass tax legislation. It is, of course,
possible to imagine adding an averaging provision (or any other tax
change) onto a bill that is otherwise going to pass, but to imagine such
a possibility is merely to concede that any particular piece of
legislation is generally rather difficult to pass. Other than the
happenstance of finding an existing legislative vehicle on which to
take a free ride, getting the tax law changed is difficult. (Of course,
even getting a provision added to a bill is never guaranteed.) While a
general description of the political process in changing the tax code is
well beyond the scope of this article, it is at least worth emphasizing
that nothing happens without a cost.
In addition to the legislative costs of adopting legislation to allow
for averaging of income, there are transition costs associated with any
change. Because we are not writing on a blank slate, there is always a
social cost associated with educating the public about a change and
getting them to work with the new system. 9 At the most basic level,
there is what might be called an "efficiency of the familiar," which is
simply to say that it is cheaper to allow people to continue to do what
they are doing rather than forcing them to adapt to something new.
108 144 CONG. REC. S4413 (daily ed. May 6, 1998) (remarks of Sen. Grassley, R-
Iowa).
109 For a book-length discussion of transition costs in taxation, see DANIEL N.
SHAVIRO, WHEN RULES CHANGE: AN ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS OF
TRANSITION RELIEF AND RETROACTIVITY (2000).
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There is also an administrative cost associated with any attempt to
treat differences in taxpayers more finely than we currently do. As an
analogy, consider the current tax treatment of capital gains from the
sale of a home. Under the current law, taxpayers can escape taxation
on such gain if "during the 5-year period ending on the date of the
sale or exchange, such property has been owned and used by the
taxpayer as the taxpayer's principal residence for periods aggregating
two years or more."11 This exclusion is limited to $500,000 for most
joint tax returns and $250,000 for single taxpayers."'
One obvious effect of these provisions is that they prevent those
who buy homes and sell them for a quick profit from taking advantage
of a tax benefit that is clearly intended to assist middle-class
homeowners. Even so, Congress recognized that there will be
situations in which homeowners who are not motivated by profit
might find themselves selling houses that they have lived in for less
than two years. If so, they are now permitted to exclude a fraction of
the maximum exclusion, based on the amount of time that they
actually did own the home (e.g., a single person living in a house for
112one year can exclude up to $125,000 in gain). That partial bailout is
limited, though, to sales due to changes in "place of employment,
health, or ... unforeseen circumstances.""1 3 Even with this level of
detail (with regulations necessary to clarify such issues as what
constitutes "unforeseen circumstances"), it is still possible that a
person might sell succeeding principal residences twice in less than
two years, not because she is changing jobs or due to health issues yet
also not because she is buying and selling homes for profit (and is thus
not the presumed target of the tax writers). Someone who lives in a
house for two years receives much better tax treatment than a
similarly situated person who lives in their house for only one year
and 364 days. Fine-tuning the tax code still further to relieve such
horizontal inequity is possible, but at some point we decide that
taxpayers will have to live with the consequences of their decisions
(even if they made their decisions in ignorance of the details of the tax
law). The cost simply is not worth the benefit.
The analogy between income averaging and home sales is hardly
perfect, of course, but it at least illustrates that our decision whether
or not to fix this "inequity" depends in part on how common we think
110 I.R.C. § 121(a).
I.R.C. § 121(b).
112 I.R.C. § 121(c).
113 I.R.C. § 121(c)(2)(B).
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it is and how costly we expect it to be to alter the tax code - and to
do so with well-crafted legislation that is implemented appropriately.
In this article, I make no claim that the costs of adopting income
averaging provisions into the tax code are "large" or "small" in any
systematic sense of those words. Indeed, if they could be measured
accurately, the costs might well turn out to be nominal. If I am correct
that there is a very weak moral case for fixing the possible horizontal
inequities that worried Vickrey, though, then even trivial costs might
be enough to cause us not to adopt an averaging proposal on
horizontal equity grounds. As I will argue below, the case for making
income averaging available to some groups of taxpayers gains traction
not on horizontal equity grounds but on vertical ones. Making income
averaging available to some taxpayers is worth the cost if the
beneficiaries, to put it simply, "need help."
C. Progressivity as a Goal of Tax Policy
This section looks directly at the question of progressivity in the
tax code - why it is good and how to achieve it, leaving aside the
economic or administrative effects of tax reform.1 4 For all of the
discussion of changing our tax system to some less progressive
alternative,' 15 the basic and continuing commitment to progressivity
has been notable in the U.S. federal tax system.16  Given the
widespread acceptance of progressivity as a feature of income tax
systems, it might be tempting simply to take progressivity as a given in
114 Although it may go without saying, it cannot hurt to note that the term
"progressivity" is somewhat misleading in the context of tax policy, because of the
increasing use of the word "progressive" as a synonym for left-leaning or liberal
political thought. While many (if not most) people who identify themselves as
politically progressive also support a progressive tax system, not all do; nor do all non-
progressives reject tax progressivity. See Mark S. Hoose, The Conservative Case for
Progressive Taxation, 40 NEW ENG. L. REV. 69, 110 (2005) ("[A] case can be made out
for classical conservative support of the current system of progressive income
taxation."). Similarly, even those who support progressivity need not support a
progressive tax on an income base. See Edward J. McCaffery & Richard E. Wagner,
A Bipartisan Declaration of Independence from Death Taxation, 88 TAx NOTES 801
(Aug. 7, 2000), where McCaffery identifies himself as a liberal who supports a highly
progressive consumption tax.
115 See generally McNulty, supra note 3.
116 See Stein, supra note 18. Stein argued that "[N]one of the tax reform
proposals now in circulation would reject progressivity." Id. Ten years later, that
remains true - because the tax reform proposals in 2006 are basically the same
proposals that were being discussed in 1996.
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the analysis below."'
The argument here, though, is not merely another general call for
progressivity. I argue more specifically that the normative values that
underlie popular and scholarly support for progressivity are most
potent when we are concerned with the poorest among us. That is,
arguments in favor of progressivity are fundamentally based on
arguments to help lower-income earners; and while those arguments
continue to have force when thinking about the appropriate taxation
of a person who earns, say, $600,000 versus someone who earns
$6,000,000, the arguments are much less powerful than when
comparing either of those earners to someone earning $16,000.
Progressivity matters most at the lower end of the spectrum. As we
look at higher income levels, progressivity matters relatively less and
other issues such as administrability and simplicity matter relatively
more.
As noted, progressivity was also a core focus of Vickrey's analysis:
[TIhe personal income tax [should not be] forced to yield
place to arbitrary or regressive forms of taxation ....
[C]umulative averaging may well be the essential key to
retaining for the personal income tax its proper role in an
adequately progressive revenue system. More than ever, it
merits first place in any 'Agenda for Progressive Taxation.' 
1 8
Why should the government attempt to redistribute money from
the successful to those who are less so? There are, of course, a
number of moral and philosophical traditions that attempt to answer
that very question, and the literature on this issue is vast. A very good
addition to that literature, which also reviews the literature on tax
justice in a comprehensive and comprehensible manner, is the recent
book by Murphy and Nagel."' As they argue, issues such as tax
incidence are of only instrumental importance, with the real goal
being to know "whether a given change in the tax law will increase or
reduce inequality, the level of welfare of the worst off, equality of
117 But see Robert L. Bartley, Jack Kemp vs. Henry Simons, WALL ST. J., Jan. 18,
1996, at A14 (lamenting Henry Simons' role as the "godfather of the notion that the
tax system should be used to redistribute income," and advocating the argument that
"if one taxpayer earns ten times as much as his neighbor, he should pay ten times as
much in taxes" - though even that proposal maintains at least nominal progressivity
by allowing for a personal exemption).
118 Vickrey, After Thirty Years 1972, supra note 12, at 132-33.
19 MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 95.
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opportunity, and so on.', 20 In other words, common tools of tax
analysis such as distribution tables are helpful, but the real issue is the
justice of the after-tax outcomes, not whether a tax system has steep
or flat progression or any other systemic feature. 2'
Murphy and Nagel's concern with inequality is well placed, as
long-term trends towards ever-greater inequality in the United States
continue to intensify:
[N]ew CBO data ... show that the income gap widened
significantly between 2002 and 2003. The income gap had
narrowed somewhat in 2001 and 2002, due in part to the sharp
decline in the stock market after its peak in 2000. The data
for 2003, however, show a return to the long-term trend of
increasing income inequality. Further, other available
evidence from the Census Bureau and from surveys of
executive pay indicate that income inequality has continued
122to grow in the years since 2003.
The introduction of vertical equity into the discussion, therefore,
supports the argument in Part IV.D below that Vickrey's concerns for
horizontal equity will have their greatest resonance inasmuch as they
address problems related to the poor. I will argue that horizontal
concerns among higher-income workers raised by the annual tax
accounting system are a matter of much lesser concern than those
raised by middle and, especially, lower-income earners. Vertical
concerns, therefore, ultimately should drive the decision on whether
to use income averaging, and if so, to whom it should be available.
,20 Id. at 131.
2 Compare Tom Daley, Progressive? Yes. But Steeply Progressive?, 109 TAX
NOTES 395 (Oct. 17, 2005) ("[T]he U.S. system is progressive. How progressive is
open to debate, because measures like taxes paid as a percentage of AGI reported are
blunt instruments, at best, for assessing the fairness of a tax system.") with Jim
Saxton, JEC Chair Saxton Responds to Tom Daley, 109 TAX NOTEs 685, 685-86 (Oct.
31, 2005) ("Given... that the top percentiles of tax filers pay taxes well in excess of
their share of AGI, it is not misleading to describe the federal income tax as steeply
progressive.").
122 Isaac Shapiro & Joel Friedman, New CBO Data Indicate Growth in Long-
Term Income Inequality Continues (Ctr. on Budget & Policy Priorities, Washington,
D.C.), Jan. 30, 2006, at 1, available at http://www.cbpp.org/1-29-06tax.pdf.
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1. The Basics of Progressivity
In a strict definitional sense, tax progressivity is a question of
simple arithmetic: a tax system is progressive if the fraction of income
paid in taxes rises as income rises. Of course, it is possible for this
fraction to rise and fall in different ranges of the income distribution,
so that an entire tax system might exhibit progressivity, regressivity,
and proportionality in different segments of the income range.
In evaluating a change in the tax system, a policy is progressive if
it increases the difference in the fraction of income paid in taxes as
income rises, with regressivity and proportionality defined
analogously. In other words, it is possible to propose a system that, in
the strict sense, is progressive; but the change from the old system to
the new one can still be a regressive change if the difference in the
proportion of taxes paid by rich and poor is smaller than under the old
system. For example, moving from a system with a range of average
tax rates between 0% and 50% to system where the range (over the
same income levels) is 15% to 16.9% is a regressive change from a
more progressive system to a less progressive system.
It is extremely important to note that advocacy of progressive
taxation does not require one to believe that the highest income
people did not "earn" their high returns.1 3 That is, it is possible to
believe that the richest taxpayers should pay a larger share even while
believing that they otherwise "deserve" what they have been paid (in
the sense that their earnings are not distorted by any market
imperfections). This simply means that the highest-income earners
will still be asked to pay a higher percentage of their income than the
lowest - leaving everyone in the same relative positions that they
started from, but closer together in absolute terms. 114 Since this is a
123 Cf, e.g., Tyco's Former Top Lawyer Says He Deserved Big Bonus, N.Y.
TIMES, June 25, 2004, at C3 ("Tyco International's former general counsel... told
jurors yesterday that he earned 'every dollar' he got from the company, denying a
government charge that he stole a $17 million bonus.").
124 On the other hand, for those who believe that the reward structure of the
economy is well-calibrated to the amount of a person's talents and efforts, it is
possible to argue that high-income earners are "better" members of society than are
others who earn less. That is, if a person starts a business, and that business is
successful, they have not only bettered their own lives but those of many others.
From there, it could be argued that the tax system should be regressive, if not actually
exempting high-income people from all taxes outright. The way for society to pay
tribute to these people for their extraordinary contributions, this line of reasoning
might continue, is to forgive any tax obligations that their incomes might create.
What would remain unclear from such a line of reasoning is why it is only an
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moral judgment, it could even coexist with the concern that
progressive taxation might somehow "punish" the most able in
society, since the punishment can be judged to be more or less
acceptable depending on one's moral views of how badly off we can
allow the least able members of society to be.
For those who believe that the market system does not always
allocate rewards in perfect proportion to a meaningful notion of just
desserts, however, the case for progressivity is even easier to make. If
one believes that the wages and salaries determined by the market
system are not determined by each worker's marginal productivity, for
example, it becomes relatively simple to argue that progressivity is an
appropriate goal of tax policy. Quite simply, if rewards do not flow
systematically from productivity, it would become the duty of those
who oppose progressivity to justify the high incomes of the winners,
rather than the other way around. If there is a random element to
income determination - luck, if you will - then there is nothing
morally suspect about taxing people's income at progressive rates.
121
2. Utility and Progressivity
The argument for a redistributive, progressive tax system is often
expressed in a familiar, technical form. Early economists made "the
basic case for progressivity" by saying that, "because the utility of
another dollar of income is smaller the larger a person's income is,
taking a dollar from a rich person imposed less sacrifice than taking a
dollar from a poor one.' '126  This argument has a great deal of
normative appeal, tapping into the notion that $50,000 spent on the
birthday party of a rich person's one-year-old could not possibly
generate as much happiness as $5 spent on meals for 10,000 poor
people. Or, to put it more colorfully: "Paris Hilton very likely has a
much lower marginal utility of money than someone slaving in the salt
mines 60 hours a week to support his family. Redistribution from
Paris Hilton to the worker makes sense.'
127
argument for zero taxes on the rich, rather than outright reverse-Robin Hood
strategies, i.e., income-based subsidies to those with incomes above a certain level.
This argument is clearly not one that I advocate. It simply reminds us that the notion
of "just desserts" can lead us in sometimes surprising directions.
12 See Hal R. Varian, In the Debate Over Tax Policy, the Power of Luck
Shouldn't Be Overlooked, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 2001, at C2.
126 Stein, supra note 18.
127 Joseph Bankman & David A. Weisbach, The Superiority of an Ideal Income
Tax Over an Ideal Consumption Tax 11 (Colloquium on Tax Policy & Pub. Fin., N.Y.
Univ. Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 8, 2006), available at http://www.law.nyu.edu/
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As is now well known, though, the elusive nature of utility makes
this argument largely a matter of conjecture. First, it is possible that
individuals or groups simply might not experience declines in utility
when receiving more income. It violates none of the axioms of
economic rationality for a person to be equally happy with each new
dollar received as they were with the last. A person might even
become increasingly money-grubbing as they earn more money, thus
finding herself happier and happier with each new infusion of cash.
This, though, seems unlikely to be a general phenomenon (and might
even qualify as a psychological disorder), and "an assumption of
declining marginal utility of wealth seems an unproblematic
assumption. ,128 But again, we do not really know how widespread this
phenomenon might be.
Second, even if individuals experience diminishing marginal
utility, comparisons between individuals might not support the
standard argument for redistribution. If a wealthy person receives
generally higher utility from money than a poor person does (though
both experience declining marginal utility as income is received), it
might well be the case that the increase in the poor person's utility is
not large enough to offset the decrease in the wealthy person's utility.
For some, the conclusion is obvious: "[O]nce we realized that
there was no way to compare or add together the utilities of different
people, the idea of minimizing some national total of sacrifice flew out
the window."'29  One can then put the argument for progressive
redistribution as simply as saying that extreme inequality is "unjust or
unlovely" and that a progressive income tax is a good way to reduce• •.. 130
inequality. This does not, of course, purport to be an argument but
simply expresses moral revulsion at inequality in an especially
memorable way.
Rather than simply rejecting the notion of comparing different
people's utility, though, one can accept that this is a matter of
conjecture but still use the concept of diminishing marginal utility of
money as a helpful heuristic to describe the "unloveliness" of
inequality in a more mechanical manner. "[I]t may not be
inappropriate for society to conclude that a taxpayer's high personal
utility from uses of certain resources - such as a second Rolls Royce
colloquia/taxpolicy/papers/06/Bankman-Weisbach.doc.
128 Id. at 10 n.13.
129 Stein, supra note 18.
130 Id. (describing the views of Henry Simons).
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- has less social worth than alternative uses.' ' 31  We draw this
conclusion not because we really believe that all people have the same
utility functions, but because "they may be appropriately treated as
though they did."' 32
Having made this assumption, the next step is simply to say that it
is highly probable that the utility gain from helping a truly destitute
person is presumptively quite high - and certainly higher than utility
losses due to taking money away from higher-income earners. Even if
we are comfortable with that analysis, though, it is less clear that such
a comparative utility analysis works well among higher-income
earners. Moving from $10,000 to $11,000 in disposable income is
almost certainly much better than going from $100,000 to $101,000, or
from $1,000,000 to $1,001,000. As income rises, though, the
comparisons become harder to justify. While it feels comfortable
assuming that a person who makes $20,000 is much, much better off
than one who makes $10,000 (and that their extra happiness from the
increased income of $10,000 is much, much larger than the lost
happiness of someone whose after-tax income drops from $750,000 to
$740,000), it is less certain that someone who makes $740,000 is better
off in utility terms at all than someone who makes $700,000 - or,
more importantly, that taking $10,000 from the $740,000 earner would
generate less unhappiness than taking it from the $700,000 earner. At
the very least, it is fair to question that assumption.
In short, utility analysis can be used not only to justify
progressivity in general but to support the basic approach adopted
here, that the notion of progressivity matters most at the low end of
the income spectrum. Designing a tax system from scratch, one would
of course adopt progressive rates throughout the income scale; but if
we were only looking at differences among those whose basic needs
are already being comfortably satisfied, the case for progressivity
would be much less compelling. The normative case for progressivity
is, in other words, mostly about the least fortunate among us.
3. Rawls and Distributive Justice
The flexibility of utilitarian computations discussed in the
preceding section is an important element of the philosophical
literature on distributive justice. The "pure priority view" of
distributive justice "counts an improvement to the welfare of someone
131 Schmalbeck, supra note 34, at 550.
132 Id.
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worse off more heavily than an improvement of the same absolute
magnitude to the welfare of someone better off." '133 This approach
simply allows one to adopt some kind of utilitarian calculus that has
been modified to count gains to the poor as explicitly more important
than numerically comparable losses to the rich.
The extreme version of this argument treats improvements to the
conditions of the worst off as having strict priority over any losses to
the better off. This is embodied in Rawls's difference principle,
"according to which differences in wealth and standard of living
between different social groups are justified only to the extent that the
system that generates those inequalities also does at least as well for
the interests of the worst-off group as any alternative system.'
134
The importance of Rawls's difference principle is that it prevents
even a society with a small number of poor people from deciding that
the losses to the nonpoor from redistribution are (even though those
losses are discounted by some amount because they are not borne by
the poor) large enough that it is acceptable to tolerate a permanent
underclass.
Volumes have been written on these and other philosophical
issues in taxation. The point once again is that, like the arguments
from pure utilitarianism and from the Judeo-Christian perspective
(discussed below), there are respectable (and even convincing)
philosophical theories of distributive justice that call not just for
progressivity in taxation but for progressive tax polices that are
motivated by - and aimed toward alleviating - the problems
associated with the least well off in society. The further we move
away from the lowest-income taxpayers, the less moral strength there
is in arguments to alleviate horizontal or vertical inequities.
4. Judeo-Christian Morality
As noted above, there is a surprisingly broad consensus that
progressivity should be a central concern of tax policy. Where does
this consensus come from? While the utility-based and related
philosophical analyses discussed above provide support for
progressivity, the basis for this broad support in the United States
quite likely flows more directly from the Judeo-Christian emphasis on
compassion for the poor. This compassion for the poor goes hand in
133 MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 95, at 53 (citing DEREK PARFIT, EQUALITY OF
PRIORITY? THE LINDLEY LECTURE (1991)).
134 Id. at 54 (citing JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, ch. 2 (revised ed. 1999)).
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hand with a concern for some in society being "too rich,"'' 35 although
the two concerns are not necessarily connected. Such terms as
"grotesque" and "obscene" are commonly used to describe large.1 e136
amounts of wealth - as well as overt displays thereof. These terms
might be invoked when arguing, for example, that it is simply
unacceptable to have poor mothers choosing between feeding their
children or buying them medicine while others in the society choose
between Porsches and Mercedes.
Susan Pace Hamill recently published a law review article
discussing scriptural bases for tax progressivity, focusing on tax
inequities in her home state of Alabama.' Looking at both the Old
and New Testaments, Hamill argues: "From these biblical texts two
broad moral principles of Judeo-Christian ethics emerge,...
forbidding the economic oppression of low-income [persons] and
requir[ing], not only that their basic needs be met, but also that they
enjoy at least a minimum opportunity to improve their economic
circumstances and, consequently, their lives. 13 8 Hamill points out that
the ability-to-pay principle is supported by her scriptural sources:
"[W]hen distinguishing ethical from unethical tax structures, Judeo-
Christian ethics use broad principles similar to traditional tax policy
theory, both indicating that tax burdens should be apportioned
,,139according to some measure of the taxpayer's ability to pay ....
Most importantly, the poor occupy a central place in Hamill's
summary of Judeo-Christian ethics. More than anything else, she
says, the poor must occupy our attention in designing tax policies: "At
a minimum, the income tax structure must be reformed to raise the
exemptions to a sufficient level so that individuals and families below
135 Clearly, however, this conflicts with other tenets of the American psyche, that
"more is better" and that winners are better than losers. If one recognizes that high
tax rates do not actually make rich people poor, however, perhaps this is not a
contradiction at all.
136 See, e.g., Gretchen Morgenson, A 'Holy Cow' Moment in Payland, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 19, 2006, § 3, at 1 ("Everybody knows that executive compensation at
many companies has been obscene. What everybody does not know is how obscene
obscene is now.").
137 Susan Pace Hamill, An Argument for Tax Reform Based on Judeo-Christian
Ethics, 54 ALA. L. REV. 1 (2002). Professor Hamill continues her discussion of these
issues in a more recent article. Susan Pace Hamill, An Evaluation of Federal Tax
Policy Based On Judeo-Christian Ethics, 25 VA. TAX REV. 671 (2006); see also Adam
Chodorow, Tax Reform: What Would God Do?, 108 TAX NOTES 1167 (Sept. 5, 2005).
138 Susan Pace Hamill, An Argument for Tax Reform Based on Judeo-Christian
Ethics, 54 ALA. L. REV. 1, 8 (2002).
139 Id. at 4.
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the poverty line do not pay any income taxes."' 4
While scripture provides strong support for the idea that morality
requires concern for the poor, at the same time there is very little
evident concern about the relative treatment of those who are doing
well. In relation to the horizontal equity concerns addressed by
income averaging, it is difficult to find guidance in scripture about
how to treat two people who earn, say, $200,000 over two years, where
one earns $80,000 and $120,000 while the other earns $100,000 and
$100,000. This is not to say that scripture supports horizontal inequity,
of course, but only that the vertical equity question is the exclusive
focus of the moral analysis.
The lesson to be learned from Hamill's scriptural analysis,
therefore, is that the focus of tax policy should be directly on helping
the poor. There is no conflict between the utility-based arguments
above and the religion-based argument here.
D. Does Cumulative Averaging Appropriately Address Fundamentally
Important Policy Concerns?
As discussed earlier, the fundamental threshold issue addressed in
this article is whether the gains from adopting any system of income
averaging would be worth the cost of enacting and administering the
system. This question would remain even if there were only minor
costs and tradeoffs involved in adopting any given proposal, because
even a little bit of pain can be sufficient to outweigh very minor gains.
It is useful to evaluate the importance of the problem that
cumulative averaging would address in the context of the argumentsS 141
for horizontal and vertical equity discussed above. As described
earlier, the policy conclusion is that the gains from adopting income
averaging do not generate compelling arguments for allowing
averaging except among lower-income earners.
1. Averaging and High-Income Earners
Schmalbeck's 1984 paper was most directly focused on the then-
current system of income averaging, as discussed above.14 ' His
analysis "suggest[ed] that outright repeal of the income averaging
provisions would save considerable tax revenue, improve the vertical
equity of the tax system, and put the horizontal equity of the tax
140 Id. at 77.
141 See supra Part IV.B-C.
142 Schmalbeck, supra note 34, at 512-23, 557-64.
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system on a sounder footing by consistently using an annual rather
than a multiyear standard of measurement."'' 43 Not knowing that the
averaging system would soon be completely repealed (indeed, viewing
immediate and complete repeal as a "somewhat radical
suggestion"), 44 Schmalbeck offered a menu of choices to improve the
averaging system without completely repealing it.
45
With the system that was the object of Schmalbeck's ire now
history, his paper still provides an excellent critique of the equitable
arguments in favor of any averaging system. Using that paper as a
touchstone, I discuss here the basic question that Vickrey seems to
have taken for granted: Should we really care about the effects of
income fluctuations on tax liabilities, especially among those who
might occasionally rise into the highest earning ranks? Schmalbeck's
arguments that the answer is generally "no" remain persuasive today,
and there is a basic equity argument to investigate before returning to
his important work.
As described above, the most basic case for averaging of income
proceeds from the undeniable observation that an annual accounting
framework is arbitrary and that income volatility is likely to have
arbitrary effects in a system with graduated marginal tax rates. Such a
result seems to violate the notion of horizontal equity, by which "the
system should not burden some individuals significantly more than
others on the basis of trivial differences in economic status."' 46 The
horizontal inequity that would be addressed by income averaging,
though, is upon closer inspection not a matter of great concern from
the standpoint of addressing social inequality.
One source of annual income volatility is, of course, the type of
employment in which a taxpayer is engaged. Many (almost certainly
most) types of jobs provide regular paychecks on a weekly, bi-weekly,
or monthly basis. Even when there are intense periods of the year
and slow periods of the year (for example, when law professors grade147\
exams versus almost any other time of year ), employers typically
still spread pay out evenly. Even so, not everyone receives income on
143 Id. at 564.
I" Id.
145 Id. at 564-76 (suggesting changes in the statutory formula for computing
average income, an option to average when income declines precipitously, and
election of a self-averaging device to spread out the taxes due on large, nonrecurrent
receipts of income).
146 Id. at 546.
147 As one uncredited wag said about teaching in law school (and doubtless
elsewhere in academia): "They pay us to grade. We teach for free."
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a regular basis.
It is somewhat surprising, though, that examples of taxpayers
whose incomes are likely to be highly volatile on an extended basis
are not easy to come by. In colloquia and classroom presentations,
the example that I found myself invoking regularly was professional
athletes, who have high incomes - sometimes stunningly high
incomes - during their very short careers and (except in a tiny
number of cases where endorsement deals are available or the young
retiree works in broadcasting) have very low earned income
thereafter. Entertainers seem to fit the category, too, with the
prototype being someone lucky enough to be cast on a successful
television program for a few years before sliding into has-been
obscurity.
These are perhaps interesting (though small) categories of
earners, and I discuss the merits of their situations below; but are
there other - perhaps more obviously compelling - examples of
taxpayers who pay unjustly high taxes because of our annual system of
taxation? Given that a revenue-neutral system could impose higher
taxes on everyone else in order to erase this supposed inequity, the
answer to this question has direct consequences for everyone.
If one of the consequences of choosing the highly uncertain (but
apparently quite fulfilling) life of an adored athlete or a pampered
actor is that you pay higher taxes because of your volatile income, the
difference can easily be dismissed by those who care about
progressivity as being not a matter of great moral outrage. The higher
taxes are not horizontally inequitable, because these categories of
employment are meaningfully different from all others. The slightly
lower after-tax lifetime income might even be viewed as the price one
pays for actually being able to live one's dream - a dream shared by
many but achieved by very few.)48 Viewed in horizontal equity terms,
therefore, the system does not fail to treat likes alike, because there
148 Another dream shared by many is winning the lottery. Certainly a lottery win
could push a person's income into a higher tax bracket. What Schmalbeck noted in
1984 appears to be just as true today, however: lotteries at least offer the option for
recipients to receive their winnings in annual installments, sometimes over the space
of decades. Schmalbeck, supra note 34, at 556 n.167. If that option exists (and
especially if it is mandatory), then there is no horizontal equity issue for someone who
wins $1 million in the lottery compared to someone who has the same average income
over their lifetime. The lottery winner can pay less tax on their $1 million, if they care
to, by reducing their annual payments in a structured pay-out. If the gross amount of
the lottery jackpot is so large that such a strategy still results in twenty or twenty-five
years of being taxed at the maximum rate, then there is little that a lifetime averaging
scheme could do to reduce the lucky winner's aggregate tax liability.
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are nonpecuniary differences that can justify treating these volatile
earners differently.
Are there other, less easily dismissed, examples? Notably,
Vickrey offers only "athletes, authors, and others enjoying a brief
bonanza, who would be able to claim a rebate or refund if their
income subsequently fell back to a low level."'149 Schmalbeck critically
discusses the classic hypothetical example of a novelist who struggles
while writing her first book, waiting tables or driving a taxicab and
living in "an artsy but essentially deplorable neighborhood.' 50  He
demonstrates, in fact, that neither Vickrey nor I are unique in focusing
on the actor/athlete/author category for our examples. "Novelists
with this approximate career pattern provide a major archetype for
advocates of income averaging."' 5' Schmalbeck points out that the
novelist archetype is cited in congressional committee reports,52
1 154
congressional testimony, and articles.
Those who make a living writing the occasional book (a book that
must, by assumption, be a large enough seller to cover expenses for
the years of near-zero income, making them very rare even among
would-be career authors) do not seem - even in conjunction with
athletes and actors - to offer sufficient reason to adopt a system of
income averaging. I am not aware of any polling data on the subject,
but if most people would view these successful professionals as among
society's luckiest people, it becomes difficult to see where the political
will for this kind of tax reform would lie.
55
149 Vickrey, Level Playing Field 1995, supra note 12, at 5.
150 Schmalbeck, supra note 34, at 553.
151 Id.
152 Id. at 553 n.160 (citing as an example H.R. REP. No. 88-749, at A174, reprinted
in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1313, 1599).
53 Id. at 553-54 n.161 (citing, as an example, Tax Reform: Hearings before the H.
Comm. on Ways and Means, 91st Cong. 1935 (1969) (statement of Michael Waris,
Jr.)).
154 Id. at 554 n.162 (citing, as examples, M. Carr Ferguson & Edwin T. Hood,
Income Averaging, 24 TAx L. REV. 53, 91 (1968); Leslie C. Smith, How to Become
Miss America Without Achieving Any "Major Accomplishment" - Some Thoughts on
Income Averaging Provisions of the Internal Revenue Code, 54 MARO. L. REV. 329,
344 (1971)).
155 Schmalbeck also mentions inventors, lawyers on large contingent fee cases,
and entrepreneurs. See id. at 554. Perhaps such groups could generate more public
sympathy for their situations, though it is not clear why people who achieve great
financial success in these fields would be any more sympathetic than actors, athletes,
or novelists.
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Beyond political will, though, this analysis brings us back to the
moral question of why we might change our system of taxes at all. As
argued throughout this article, tax analysis appropriately includes
normative questions of personal and social fairness. Would a policy
analyst whose concerns for progressivity arise from a Judeo-Christian
perspective, for example, be particularly concerned with this type of
injustice? 56 Would Hamill's focus on the plight of the poor be shifted
to the plight of those whose incomes are temporarily high because
they won a lottery or landed a role on a television show?.1 7 Given that
her concern is for the least among us, it is difficult to picture her being
unduly troubled by the purported horizontal inequity that we see
here.58
Notwithstanding these philosophical arguments regarding
progressivity, it turns out that the case for providing relief to the
suddenly successful author, athlete, or artist is weak on other grounds
as well. Schmalbeck does not dwell on the generally unsympathetic
position that the archetypal candidate for averaging might occupy,
along the lines discussed above. Instead, he points out that the system
is already treating such a person fairly well. To begin, given that there
is a zero bracket for those with sufficiently low incomes, the future
successful author is likely to pay zero, or at least very low, taxes while
they live the life of the starving artist.
When success arrives, the income that so eluded her finally flows
into the novelist's bank account.5 9 She lives the good life, with the
opportunity to take trips and to live in conditions that are far from
deplorable. She pays more taxes (or maybe even begins to pay federal
income taxes for the first time) and at a higher marginal rate. Why
does society owe her a break on taxes? Surely not on an ability-to-pay
principle, because we have hypothesized that she possesses the ability
156 See supra Part IV.C.4.
157 Hamill, supra note 138.
158 The most sympathetic group, perhaps, is the disappointed athletes who
diverted all of their attention in their youth to honing their athletic skills, only to learn
that they are not quite good enough - or worse, only to suffer a debilitating injury
without ever having earned a large salary - and spend the rest of their lives on a
lower earning pattern than if they had focused on developing another career. Clearly,
those who fall into this group are not candidates for income averaging.
159 Of course, if success remains a stranger, we are simply looking at - from the
standpoint of the tax system, at least - a permanently low-income worker. Unless
the frustrated author's meager income is itself derived from a volatile source (which is
surely not the case for the classic example of the person who waits table or drives a
taxicab), income averaging is simply irrelevant. If it is relevant, the very limited
system described and endorsed below could deal with the situation.
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to pay taxes in her good years at higher average and marginal rates.
Moreover, as Schmalbeck notes, successful authors are in a
position to control their financial affairs to a substantial degree,
engaging in "self-averaging" to mitigate the effects of an annual tax
system.' 6° Now a draw on the lecture circuit, our novelist can decide
(within limits) when to lecture, when to write her next book, when to
be paid for it, and whether to take an advance. And she is not alone,
given that "a sizable industry exists for no other purpose than to
provide ... advice [to] structure her professional life to accomplish a
good deal of income shifting or deferral by means of Keogh plans,
royalty assignments to trusts, Individual Retirement Accounts, and
the like., 16' Even if these devices did not exist, it would still be
difficult to make a strong equity-based argument that our author
deserves a tax break. Simply saving her money and engaging in basic
financial planning should provide her with a very comfortable future -
certainly a more comfortable future than the one that faces those who
will never become famous authors.
Still, there might be something to the argument that, even if a
successful author is not a particularly sympathetic subject in the
scheme of society as a whole, horizontal inequity exists as between,
say, a newly-successful novelist and a novelist who has been successful
for a long time. If they both write books in a given year that bring
them two million dollars in royalties, why should the more
comfortable senior author pay the same tax as the younger author
who is only enjoying the first fruits of success?
While intriguing, this argument confuses income and wealth. The
senior author's presumed greater comfort would derive from previous
income, which has already been taxed at relatively high rates, and
from current taxable income derived from accumulated wealth (which
is also presumably being taxed at high rates). Given this important
difference, Schmalbeck argues that "comparisons based on wealth are
somewhat inappropriate when one is evaluating an income tax.,
16
The two authors are not, in other words, similarly situated, making the
appearance of horizontal inequity an illusion.
In sum, income averaging - especially when aimed at reducing
the tax inequalities faced by high-income taxpayers - lacks a strong
160 Schmalbeck, supra note 34, at 554.
161 Id. at 553. Obviously, the menu of tax management devices changes over the
decades, but the tax advising field is going strong. For an updated list of available
averaging devices, see Edward A. Morse, Income Averaging: Planning Options for
Eligible Taxpayers, 22 J. TAX'N INVESTMENTS 303 (2005).
162 Schmalbeck, supra note 34, at 555.
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equity-based argument that resonates with the notion of progressivity
that motivates this article (and, indeed, that seems to motivate so
much of Vickrey's work). Yes, there might be somewhat more
compelling examples of horizontal inequities generated by an annual
system of taxation, and some taxpayers will be less able than others to
mitigate those inequities. It is interesting, though, that even after
more than half a century of advocating his system of income
averaging, Vickrey did not offer any examples beyond the actors,
authors, and athletes discussed above.
The more prevalent such inequities are, the more likely it is that
people will care enough to try to change the system. As I discuss
below, the empirical evidence on the prevalence of income volatility
suggests that the problem is not widespread and that it has the largest
impact on low-income earners. (The prevalence of any tax penalties
would, of course, rise with more steeply graduated rates.) For the
types of earners discussed above, though, income volatility is not
163widespread and does not generate large losses.
As a threshold question of tax reform, therefore, the roughness of
the justice meted out to the wealthy does not seem likely to generate
widespread moral angst. Although there are instances in which
averaging might change some outcomes, it is still possible to agree
(which perhaps tempered enthusiasm) that "the annual period...
seems roughly accurate for purposes of computing income."
M
2. Averaging and Low-Income Earners
Rough justice is always roughest on the poor. Professor Lily
Batchelder recently published a brilliant article analyzing the
prevalence and consequences of income volatility, finding that it poses
serious problems for significant numbers of low-income earners.161
She concluded that a very limited system of income averaging would
generate important benefits to the poorest members of our society.S
66
It is for these taxpayers, rather than for the ultimately quite successful
artists and inventors discussed above, that a careful change in policy
would be most appropriate.
The combination of rising out of the zero bracket and losing
eligibility for the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) creates a
161 See infra Part IV.D.2.
164 Schmalbeck, supra note 34, at 552.
165 Batchelder, supra note 5.
I' d. at 421 et seq.
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potential tax penalty of extremely large proportions for the working
poor. Using 2001 rates, Batchelder compared a person earning $0 one
year and $35,000 the next year with another earning $17,500 each
year. The volatile earner would pay an average of $624 per year in
taxes, while the steady earner would pay no income taxes. More
significantly, the volatile earner loses an average of $3866 per year
due to not being eligible for the EITC in either year. Her total loss is
$8980. 167
While that example was designed specifically to show the large
amounts potentially at stake, Batchelder goes on to calculate that
"[a]nnual income measurement increases the tax burden on poor
taxpayers by an average of 2.0 percentage points compared to long-
term income averaging - a tax penalty four times greater than that
experienced by high-income families."'6 More bluntly, "[1]ow-income
families do not.., experience the same level of income volatility" as
other taxpayers. 16  The relationship between income volatility and
income, in fact, is negative.170 This is a matter of real concern, at least
for those who consider the alleviation of poverty to be a major tax
policy goal.
In response to this limited but very important (and very solvable)
problem, Batchelder proposes a system that she calls "Targeted
Averaging," under which low-income earners would be eligible to
take advantage of two very simple tools to reduce the tax penalty on
their varying incomes: (1) averaging incomes for two years in
calculating eligibility for the EITC, and (2) carrying back for one year
unused standard deductions and personal and dependent
171exemptions. Why limit the system to two years? Because most
income volatility for the working poor dissipates quickly: "Three
quarters of income volatility is gone after one year and nearly all after
three to four years.' '7  Batchelder suggests that although these data
(which are at this point somewhat dated) might argue in favor of a
three-year averaging system rather than a two-year system, the
167 Id. at 404.
168 Id. at 397.
169 Id. at 411.
170 Id. at 415.
171 Id. at 397.
172 Id. at 423 (citing William T. Dickens, The Growth of Earnings Instability in the
U.S. Labor Market: Comments and Discussion, in 2 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON.
AcTIVITY 262, 265 (1994), in turn citing Robert Moffitt & Peter Gottschalk, Trends in
the Covariance Structure of Earnings in the United States: 1969-1987, 1001-93 (Inst.
for Research on Poverty, Univ. of Wisconsin Discussion Paper, 1993)).
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greater simplicity in calculations and record-keeping justifies the
tradeoff.'73 Given that Targeted Averaging unavoidably makes the
tax system somewhat more complex for lower income earners - for
whom compliance burdens with the EITC are already a matter of
legitimate concern - any reduction in additional complexity is a boon.
The difference between two and three years, though, is of only
minor concern here. The more fundamental point is that Batchelder's
system would involve a very small change in the tax system that would
affect only a fraction of all taxpayers, whereas a general system of
income averaging would affect all taxpayers and thus would be much
more disruptive than Batchelder's plan. (Vickrey's full-scale plan to
replace the current income tax system, of course, contemplates
wholesale change in the entire code.) Targeted averaging, meanwhile,
relieves a very real burden on the poorest workers, while more
generally available income averaging would address purported
horizontal inequities among the highly (if sometimes temporarily)
affluent. While the problems posed by low-income volatility could
potentially also be solved as part of a more general averaging system
(though Vickrey does not focus on the issue), solving that problem by
adopting a large-scale change to the tax system begins to resemble
using a cannon to open a locked door.
It is possible, though, that the best argument for adopting
Batchelder's plan is not based on income averaging at all. Is the
motivation for such a plan our observation that some low-income
people have it better than other low-income people, i.e., is this really
about a failure to treat likes alike? This is where the revenue
neutrality discussion has teeth, because it forces us to confront where
we would come up with the money to fund the tax reductions and the
EITC benefits that would flow to the poor volatile earners under
Targeted Averaging.
If we are talking about system-wide revenue neutrality, the
answer is very simple for anyone motivated by the concerns for the
poor discussed above. If we can make low-income volatile earners
better off without making low-income smooth earners worse off, that
is an outcome that any advocate of progressive taxation could support.
Funding the difference by taxing higher-income earners or through
deficit spending seems easy to justify, especially since the aggregate
amounts of money are likely to be relatively low.
Even if we for some reason required the Targeted Averaging




well worth it. Shifting resources around among the poor would always
feel awful, because those who end up losing net income can ill afford
it. Even so, if it is necessary to push down the after-tax incomes of
smooth income earners among the poor in order to prevent volatile
earners from being hit with the kinds of penalties that Batchelder
describes (and thus ending up in even more desperate straits than
their poor compatriots), the difficult tradeoff would still be defensible.
Fortunately, of course we are not required to finance the
Targeted Averaging system from the meager resources of the working
poor. We should explicitly choose to finance averaging for the poor
from the nonpoor.
3. Averaging and Middle-Income Earners
Having discussed averaging with respect to the high and low ends
of the income spectrum, what of the middle? As noted above,
Batchelder's analysis showed that the losses to the poor due to income
fluctuations were larger than any other income class. She noted,
though, that income volatility was negatively correlated with income,
not that income volatility was limited entirely to the poor. If that is
the case, perhaps averaging should be extended to the ranks of the
middle class, or at least the lower middle class.
One argument against the extension of Targeted Averaging to the
nonpoor is that the large majority of the loss suffered by the poor
from the failure to average income is a loss in EITC benefits, not a
penalty in taxes paid.'74 Middle-income earners do not qualify for the
EITC, so the largest part of the gain from Targeted Averaging is
irrelevant to them. Of course, middle-income earners pay more taxes
than do poor earners (some of whom pay no federal income taxes at
all), raising the stakes for middle-income earners.
In any case, there is no need to exclude everyone who is not
officially poor from taking advantage of the tax aspects of Targeted
Averaging. The official definitions of "poor" are, after all, by their
nature arbitrary."' Just as there is reasonable room for debate over
174 See supra note 167 and accompanying text (showing that less than one-fifth of
the total loss for a poor taxpayer with volatile income is due to taxes paid, with the
remainder due to lost EITC benefits).
175 See, e.g., Anna Bernasek, A Poverty Line That's Out of Date and Out of
Favor, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2006, § 3, at 6 (describing shortcomings with the
traditional method of computing a federal poverty line and noting that a Census
Bureau analysis for 2003 indicated that five million additional people would have
been counted among the ranks of the impoverished under a computational method
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whether the system should average incomes over two years or three
years, we can agree that the upper limits of any system should be
determined by looking at the data and seeing how many people will
be helped by averaging, bearing in mind that expansion of the system
carries with it administrative and other costs.
A different way to conceptualize the middle-income analysis is
not by the numbers of people affected but by the categories of people
who might be expected to display volatile incomes. In the analysis of
high-income volatility above, the major focus of the analysis was not
on how many people might benefit from averaging but on whether the
professions most likely to experience volatile incomes were in some
sense sympathetic enough to merit relief from an artifact of the annual
tax system. While it proved difficult to find a sympathetic class of
taxpayers there, perhaps the middle class provides more fertile
ground.
One important source of income volatility for many middle-
income families is not that a worker holds a job that exhibits uneven
earnings patterns but that one member of the family moves into and
out of the work force in different years. Most obviously, parents
(usually mothers) who exit the labor force to care for children or
other family members might well find themselves facing tax penalties
compared to what they might pay if income taxes were based on
multi-year averages. With a refundable system, such families could
possibly receive income tax refunds during the years when their total
incomes have dropped due to the mother's putting her job on hold.
Such relief would certainly be welcome to such a family.
This situation seems sympathetic - certainly vastly more
sympathetic than the actors, athletes, and artists discussed above.
Perhaps surprisingly, though, even feminist theorists are split over
whether it is a good idea to enact policies that make it easier for
women to leave their jobs to provide care-giving services at home.
Some argue that many families have two earners not because they
want to have two earners, but because they simply cannot afford to
176have one parent stay at home. If so, then we might want to enact
policies making it a bit less expensive for families to trade income for
parenting.
177
recommended by the National Academy of Sciences).
176 See generally ELIZABETH WARREN & AMELIA WARREN TYAGI, THE Two-
INCOME TRAP: WHY MIDDLE-CLASS MOTHERS AND FATHERS ARE GOING BROKE
(2003).
177 Judith Warner, The Parent Trap, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2006, at A21 ("We
need.., policies to promote part-time work options that don't force parents to forgo
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On the other hand, Barbara Bergmann argues that it is a mistake
to enable women to weaken their attachments to the labor market.
With divorce and widowhood always a possibility, women's
independence and financial survival crucially depend on being as
employable as possible - and employability springs from having been
regularly employed.
Complicating matters further is the revenue neutrality question.
If we are to pay for tax relief for this subset of middle-income earners
by shifting the tax burden to higher-income earners, that is yet
another way to shift the system toward more progressivity, though the
political discussion of it would more likely focus on family values than
tax progressivity. Whether there might be better ways to provide for
child care expenses than through the tax code is, of course, also an
important issue. Moreover, even if we use the tax code to provide
benefits to parents, there are more direct ways to do so than by
instituting an averaging system that does nothing to benefit parents
who stay in the work force. 79
If, on the other hand, we must pay for middle-class income
averaging in a distributionally neutral way, then it implies that we
would force those middle-class families who are not willing or able to
have one parent leave the work force to pay higher taxes in order to
provide tax relief to families that have been able to do so. There is no
a priori reason to believe that that is (or is not) an appropriate
reallocation of tax burdens. Clearly, these issues and myriad others
like them must be hashed out in the political process.
The case for extending averaging to middle-income earners is,
perhaps not surprisingly, inconclusive. There is no apparent reason to
rule out averaging for all middle earners, nor is it necessary here to
choose an income cutoff or a categorical limit on an averaging system.
It is quite possible that a limited averaging system could be extended
beyond the plan that Batchelder sketched out for poor workers.
Choosing those limits, and deciding when and how to change those
limits in response to changing social circumstances, goes beyond the
scope of this article.
benefits, fair pay and career prospects.").
178 Barbara Bergmann, The Only Ticket to Equality: Total Androgyny, Male
Style, 9 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUEs 75 (1998).
179 For example, the Child Tax Credit is a more direct tax subsidy for parents.
See I.R.C. § 24.
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V. SIMPLICITY, EFFICIENCY, AND INCOME AVERAGING
Even if we agree that there are no strong equity arguments in
favor of income averaging (beyond the targeted plan that I advocate),
it could be that adopting an averaging system for all taxpayers could
nevertheless offer significant improvements in the simplicity of the tax
system or in economic efficiency. If so, an averaging system could be
preferred on nonnormative grounds. The analysis in this Part
suggests, unfortunately, that an income averaging system would likely
be very complicated (both in the public's perception of it and in its
actual operation), while the efficiency effects are ambiguous and
might even cut against the adoption of an averaging system.
A. Simple or Complicated?
Vickrey maintained throughout his life that his cumulative
averaging system was a move toward simplification of the taxS 180
system. Indeed, he seemed to view simplicity as an independent
goal of his proposal, a virtue in itself in addition to progressivity. 18'
One might even read him to be saying that progressivity is a
secondary virtue of the system that can be compromised in the name
of simplicity, as he referred to an "adequately progressive system" at
the end of one of his articles."" Admittedly, this interpretation might
put a bit too much emphasis on the word "adequately," because
Vickrey otherwise seemed quite concerned with progressivity.
Nevertheless, it is at least clear that he viewed simplicity as a great
virtue of his plan.
How simple is the averaging aspect of Vickrey's plan? In his
original article, Vickrey conceded: "Any averaging device will, of
course, require a certain amount of record-keeping."' 83 Nonetheless,
"[t]he current records required under the present proposal consist of
only four items: the year in which the taxpayer commenced to
average, the adjusted total income, the total present value of past
taxes, and the total value of the capital assets of the taxpayer declared
180 Note, for example, the title of one of his papers discussed here: Tax
Simplification Through Cumulative Averaging. William Vickrey, Tax Simplification
Through Cumulative Averaging, 34 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 736 (1969).
181 Vickrey, Level Playing Field 1995, supra note 12, at 1 ("Simplicity and
progressivity can be realized .... ").
182 Vickrey, After Thirty Years 1972, supra note 12, at 133.
183 Vickrey, Averaging of Income 1939, supra note 12, at 394.
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on his latest return."' 84 In his later work, Vickrey had honed down the
administrative mechanism for such reporting:
To simplify the processing of returns, it would be possible to
attach to each return a coupon on which the taxpayer ID, the
initial year of cumulation [sic], the cumulated income and the
cumulated tax would be entered. This coupon could then be
certified by the IRS and returned to the taxpayer for use in
preparing his next year's return.'
1. Public Perceptions of Simplicity and Complexity
Despite his certainty that his system was simple - and his good
faith attempts to improve its administrability - Vickrey's system was
arguably really quite complicated. McCaffery, for example, says:
"Despite Vickrey's frequent protestations to the contrary, the idea is
complicated in practice."'86 Interestingly, McCaffery's description of
what makes the cumulative averaging system complicated consists of
simply describing the system. In substance, McCaffery's summary
differs very little from what Vickrey described in claiming that the
system is administratively simple:
It entails choosing a certain period for smoothing, adding up
cumulative income (or consumption) within the period,
subtracting previously taxed income (or consumption) and
then applying a rate structure, which could lead to negative
taxes (refunds) as well as positive taxes (payments) in the
immediate period of the return, depending on how this period
fit with the average. Human events such as marriage, divorce,
and death were subjects of some concern, and so on.181
To a substantial degree, therefore, what is simple might be merely
a matter of taste. When Vickrey's eye beheld his creation, he saw its
elegance and logical clarity. When McCaffery - and, to be
completely clear, when I - look at the same system, we see
something that hardly qualifies as simple. Perhaps more accurately,
Vickrey's professional training and interests are likely to cause him to
184 Id.
185 Vickrey, Level Playing Field 1995, supra note 12, at 5.
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think that "simple" need not mean "easy to understand," in the sense
that the Quadratic Equation and the theory of relativity are simple in
an elegant and even beautiful way. While this is a perfectly
reasonable definition of simple, and even though it has the added
advantage of distinguishing "simple" from "easy," simplicity is
probably best understood - at least in the context of tax reform -
not in the mathematical or analytical sense but in the on-the-street
sense that a simple tax system is one that is easy to understand, easy to
administer, and easy to obey.
For those of us with training in economic theory, though, it is easy
to sympathize with Vickrey's apparent assumption that some things
really ought not to be so difficult to understand. This assumption is
nicely captured by one of the smaller topics in tax policy that Vickrey
touched on in one of his final writings. Describing a policy that would
promote greater efficiency in the market for parking automobiles in
urban centers, Vickrey wrote:
A more flexible and universal system of parking charges is
needed whereby charges would be sufficiently high at times of
greatest demand that a few reasonably convenient spaces
would nearly always be available to those prepared to pay a
market-clearing price, while charges would be reduced for
times when demand is lower, being reduced to zero whenever
there would be more empty spaces than is needed for
convenience. Many technologies for doing this are
available ....188
Viewed from a theoretical perspective, it is difficult not to nod
and exclaim, "Q.E.D.!" for this is clearly a smart idea, one that is not
even on the higher end of difficulty as economic concepts go. That
this is likely to be viewed as extremely complicated (and potentially
unfair) by the driving public seems secondary to the analytical
simplicity of the system. Pushing the point further, Vickrey then adds:
"More sophisticated systems are feasible that would permit the
parking charge to be determined at the end of the parking occupancy
at rates that could be varied according to how many nearby spaces
have been vacant during the time of parking."18 9 While Vickrey
concedes that this is more "sophisticated," there is notably little if any
concern for the perceptions of the public that would actually be
subject to such a system. Instead, the focus is on first-best theoretical
188 Vickrey, Level Playing Field 1995, supra note 12, at 22-23.
189 Id. at 23.
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outcomes: "If properly calibrated, this would automatically keep the
charges at close to the market-clearing level, enhance efficiency and
raise land values."' 9
My purpose here is clearly not to impugn Vickrey's motives or his
mode of analysis as a useful step in the process of designing policies.
Instead, my concern is that he lost sight of the concept of simplicity in
the politically meaningful sense. Even if the system is "properly
calibrated," will the public tolerate a system that is difficult to
understand, to the point where it might not even be possible to know
in advance how much it will cost to park? These uncertainties
themselves could generate suspicion that the system is unfair,
precisely because its complexity makes it difficult to determine with
confidence whether the system is fair or not. Second, what if the rate
is not properly calibrated? Can it be so improperly calibrated that the
results would be worse than they are today? If so, how likely is such a
gross miscalibration? 9'
Again, these arguments go only to the question of whether tax
policies are likely to be viewed as simple in the pedestrian sense.
When McCaffery says that Vickrey's cumulative averaging plan "is
complicated in practice,"' 92 he focuses on the question that seems to
have frustrated Vickrey: Why was income averaging a nonstarter in
the real world? Even if it is possible to have a system that is less of an
administrative challenge than the income averaging system that we
abandoned in 1986, the problem is that "simple" tax plans might not
seem simple to the public at all.
I have, in fact, presented and argued in favor of simplified
versions of Vickrey's cumulative averaging plan in appearances before
a wide variety of audiences (noneconomics professors, students,
journalists, etc.), and it is fair to say that none of the audiences came
to embrace the plan or saw it as a way to simplify their tax-paying
190 Id.
191 Admittedly, various forms of differential pricing have been tried (with regard
to parking as well as other commodities, such as airline tickets), with varying degrees
of success. The point of the analogy here, though, is to highlight how easy it is to
design a system for its internal logic than for its acceptability to the public.
Complications in determining airfares, for example, are a common complaint among
customers; and attempts to complicate the pricing models still further meet with
resistance. See, e.g., Jeff Bailey & Christopher Elliott, A Move to Add Still More Fine
Print to Advertised Airfares, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2006, at C1 (quoting a travel analyst:
"Buying an airfare is confusing enough now. This could make it even more
confusing.").
192 McCaffery, supra note 186, at 880.
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lives. Even after extensive question-and-answer periods, the reaction
was most commonly along the following lines: "Seems kind of
complicated." "Is that really any better than the current system?"
"No one will understand this." While this is hardly definitive proof
that it would be impossible to educate the public to accept an
averaging plan, it at least suggests that the hurdles to acceptance are
greater than Vickrey seemed to believe. These experiences did, in any
case, contribute to my change in position from being an advocate of
cumulative averaging to being a reluctant critic.
2. Simplicity in Tax Planning
Whether or not the public could be convinced that an income
averaging system is "simple," there might still be some simplicity
advantages in setting up a system that provides fewer tax planning
opportunities. Indeed, as noted above, Vickrey believed that
averaging would be advantageous largely because of the simplification
provided by the elimination of timing advantages, with interest being
charged on tax liabilities from the date the income is earned, even
though the tax plus interest would not be paid until realized."' Even
for earned income, moreover, averaging over long periods of time
requires the computation of interest using a rate that would be set by
policy makers.'94
Even assuming away the complications that would come with
including interest rate calculations in the computation of tax liabilities,
Vickrey's suggestion that the interest rate charged on unpaid taxes
could be varied as a macroeconomic policy lever opens up an entirely
new area for planning and lobbying opportunities.'95 The availability
of the tax system's interest rate as a policy lever would become an
irresistible magnet for lobbying. The more the tax system's interest
rate is used as a policy lever, of course, the less the interest rate
193 Vickrey, Level Playing Field 1995, supra note 12, at 5-6.
194 Fennell and Stark describe the necessary steps as follows:
Under Vickrey's approach, taxpayers would, in effect, keep a lifetime tally
of both their cumulative income and the taxes paid on that income in
previous years. After adjusting these figures to include an interest
component on taxes paid in previous years, the taxpayer would then
calculate his tax liability on his new adjusted cumulated income, subtracting
the present value of previous taxes paid to derive the current year's tax
liability.
Fennell & Stark, supra note 67, at 25.
195 Vickrey, Level Playing Field 1995, supra note 12, at 6.
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adjustments in an averaging system would comport with reality.
Taxpayers would not be neutral about the timing of their income and
taxes, because the interest rates that they would pay on loans and
receive on deposits would not be reliably connected to the interest
rate used in the tax averaging system.
Arguably, of course, there could still be a net advantage from
averaging, because whereas we now charge zero interest on unrealized
gains, we would at least be charging some positive interest rate on
unpaid taxes - although Congress could certainly set the rate at zero
if it chose. This could reduce the net financial advantage, causing at
least some marginal tax planning to cease. Even so, there is always
the possibility that Congress could change the interest rate (even
retroactively), making it important for sophisticated taxpayers to plan
around possible changes in the tax system's interest rate.
In other words, even if we joined Vickrey in believing that
averaging at least "gets it right" by looking at income over time, it is
not necessarily true that being right in this way will decrease tax
planning. By analogy, consider the concept of depreciation. Under
an income tax, it is clearly important to allow taxpayers to take into
account the losses in their net worth that arise from the decrease in
the value of their assets. Allowing no depreciation deduction would
get it clearly wrong, and so would immediate expensing.
While it would certainly be wrong not to allow depreciation in an
income tax system, our experiences with accounting for depreciation
do not inspire confidence that attempting to get it right will bring
about reductions in tax planning and lobbying. The allowance for
depreciation through the Accelerated Cost Recovery System' 96 is most
definitely not an exercise in "getting it right." The system instead
creates formulae that do not reflect the useful economic life of assets
and which have the effect of "bunch[ing] the deductions in the early
years of the use of the machine."' 97 The system is hardly simple, and it
has been modified in rather radical ways on numerous occasions.' 98
While the system of depreciation was brought into existence in an
effort to measure income correctly, it has not made the tax law
simpler or reduced lobbying and planning opportunities.'99
In short, the adoption of averaging would not reliably reduce
planning opportunities. In fact, the introduction of the interest rate
196 See I.R.C. §§ 167-168.
197 WILLIAM A. KLEIN ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 28 (14th ed. 2006).
198 Id. at 548.
199 See generally id. at 544-50.
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on unpaid taxes as a controllable policy lever would introduce a new
variable into tax planning equations. Enterprising politicians would
quickly recognize that there are ways to provide tax advantages
through the system, and tax planners would be almost certain to
anticipate and take advantage of the resulting complexity.
3. Messy Design Choices
To this point, the discussion has been based on the "simple" core
of the income averaging system. In addition to the basic design, there
are additional real-world complexities that will inevitably bedevil any
attempt to design an averaging system for the United States (or any
other country). What are these other issues that would multiply the
potential complexities in an averaging system? An example or two
will illustrate the range of issues at stake.
One important question is how to define the averaging period. If
any specific number of years is unacceptably arbitrary, presumably we
must truly mean "lifetime" averaging.2°° Does that mean that we
measure income from birth? This raises the question of whether it is
fair to tax one eighteen-year-old who earned $5,000 per year from age
nine onward the same as another who earns nothing until they earn
$50,000 at age eighteen. If, on the other hand, the averaging period
begins upon the initial receipt of income, this could encourage parents
to make sure that their children earn some nominal amount of income
during childhood, simply to increase the number of years over which
income can be averaged. The question might seem narrow, but it is
likely to affect many more people than the artists, athletes, and
authors discussed above.
200 Of course, even a lifetime is arbitrary. If a taxpayer cares about-and makes
earning and consumption decisions by taking into account-the well-being of her
current and future heirs, why stop at death? Should parents' incomes be averaged
into the incomes of their children and children's children? Because children and
parents typically have overlapping earnings lifetimes, the logic of income averaging
would seem to have plausible application not just to the choice of tax period but also
to the choice of taxable unit. The two dimensions (how many people to tax as a single
unit, and how many years to aggregate in setting income tax liabilities) could interact
in profound ways that are far beyond the scope of this article. I make this point not to
trivialize the averaging issue through reductio ad absurdum but rather to point out
that the analysis in this paper presents something of a false choice: it is not a matter of
choosing between taxing a person on their income for one year or for a longer period
of time, perhaps as long as their entire life. The time periods can be longer, and the
complexity of the taxable unit can rise almost without limit.
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Similarly, the definition of retirement becomes a potential
stumbling block. How do we prevent the refundable averaging system
from becoming another retirement benefit plan? Do we require that a
person be working full time in order to benefit from averaging? Does
that apply to people mid-career, even when their part-time status is
not necessarily their choice? To each of these questions there can be
answers, but none of them are obvious from the theory of averaging.
Furthermore, Vickrey's system raises the stakes for those who
would challenge their tax assessments. If a person's tax liability is
determined by all past income, should they be able to challenge their
income determinations for every year in the averaging period? Would
a tax year ever be closed? An arbitrary statute of limitations on tax
challenges (such as three years) could be imposed, of course, with the
equity concern that a person might not have known of the importance
of challenging a tax determination until after the statute has lapsed.
On a practical level, if both the taxpayer and the Internal Revenue
Service (Service) lose the ability to contest results after three years,
while legally-binding facts from more than three years ago are used in
subsequent tax computations, this would create an added incentive to
contest or litigate close calls to guard against losing the right to
challenge facts that currently might seem too minor to challenge.
These thumbnail sketches are obviously meant only to be
suggestive, pointing out that real-world implementation issues unique
to (or heightened by) an averaging system could be quite challenging.
Other issues surely lurk, but even these brief descriptions demonstrate
that averaging raises more perplexing issues than might initially be
obvious.
It should be noted, though, that these complexity issues are very
closely tied to how ambitious we would be in adopting an averaging
system. A lifetime cumulative averaging system all but requires the
introduction of interest rate adjustments in the system, whereas a two-
or three-year averaging system would not be fatally compromised if
interest adjustments were not allowed. Moreover, Batchelder's
Targeted Averaging plan is limited to a relatively small group of
taxpayers, and many of the confusing aspects of the proposal go away
when taxpayers only have to take into account one or two previous
years of income and tax information.
Therefore, while the inevitable complexity of averaging can be
daunting, large amounts of that complexity can be eliminated by
adopting Targeted Averaging. Adoption of any averaging plan will
create some complexity, of course; but the benefits of Targeted
Averaging to the poor appear to make those costs worth bearing. The
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normative case for Targeted Averaging is compelling, and it appears
not to fail the test of simplicity.
B. Efficiency
The possibility of gains in economic efficiency raises the prospect
that a system of income averaging might be a wise policy choice
notwithstanding its weaknesses on equity and simplicity fronts. It
turns out, though, that the efficiency effects of adopting an averaging
system are hard even to conceptualize, much less measure. After a
very brief description of standard efficiency analysis, this Part will
conclude with a discussion of a less well-known theory, known as
winner-take-all markets, that suggests that lowering tax rates on high-
income occupations could have negative efficiency effects.
1. Standard Efficiency Analysis
Fennell and Stark provide a short but very nice summary of the
efficiency effects of a system of lifetime averaging.' °1 It is unnecessary
to list here the various issues that they raise, but one example should
provide the flavor of the analysis. Over time, they note, volatile
income earners face a variety of marginal tax rates; and an income
averaging system would replace those rates with a single marginal
rate. "Because higher marginal tax rates create disproportionately
larger distortions, this shift would be expected to increase
efficiency., 202 Moreover, the choice of career might be distorted by
facing a higher tax rate on incomes earned in careers with volatile
earnings patterns, causing people to choose careers that they might
203not otherwise prefer.
There are, however, also considerations that suggest that
averaging might reduce economic efficiency, because "if some
portions of the life cycle feature more elastic labor supply or different
proportions of marginal and inframarginal taxpayers, lifetime
averaging would be unable to exploit those differences. ' '204 Liebman
also provides analyses that cut both ways, finding that - even in a
simplified model where taxpayers are "present-focused" - the results
of the efficiency analysis are ambiguous. "Liebman's analysis suggests
that the desirability of income averaging from an efficiency
201 Fennell & Stark, supra note 67, at 28-32.
202 Id. at 28-29.




perspective depends, at least in part, on the relative proportions of the
population that experience flat, upward-tending, and downward-
tending income profiles.,
0 5
The efficiency analysis is also affected by the revenue neutrality
assumption. If the adoption of an averaging system requires higher
rates on all taxpayers, then any gain in efficiency to taxpayers who are
advantaged by the averaging system would be offset by distortions
from higher rates.
This brief summary of a few standard efficiency considerations is
obviously unlikely to satisfy those with an interest in such analysis.
(Those readers should refer to Liebman's working paper.) For
present purposes, though, the point is that standard efficiency analysis
does not reach a clear verdict on whether income averaging is likely to
increase or decrease economic efficiency. At best, the case for
adopting an averaging system would have to await empirical evidence
that might find a net positive effect on efficiency. Until then,
however, standard efficiency analysis does not strengthen (nor
weaken) the case for adopting a system of income averaging.
2. Efficiency and Winner-Take-All Theory
A recent argument that ties efficiency concerns to tax
progressivity relies on a relatively new theory known as "winner-take-
all" analysis .20 The basic idea is that the increasing spread between
the enormous rewards to the favored few in a small number of high-
profile positions (including CEOs, as well as actors, musicians, etc.)
and the shrinking rewards to the unlucky majority creates an
efficiency loss for the economy. This view focuses on the choices that
people must make in how to spend their time and talents during their
lifetimes. If there is an ever-widening spread between the rewards for
pursuing different activities, more people will be increasingly tempted
to compete for the shrinking number of high-paying jobs - leaving
behind economically important but less extraordinarily well-paid jobs.
Such people, without consideration of the effects of their decisions on
the overall economy, then misallocate their talents and waste valuable
20- Id. at 31.
206 ROBERT H. FRANK & PHILIP J. COOK, THE WINNER-TAKE-ALL SOCIETY: How
MORE AND MORE AMERICANS COMPETE FOR EVER FEWER AND BIGGER PRIZES,
ENCOURAGING ECONOMIC WASTE, INCOME INEQUALITY, AND AN IMPOVERISHED
CULTURAL LIFE (1995); see also Martin J. McMahon & Alice G. Abreu, Winner-
Take-All Markets: Easing the Case for Progressive Taxation, 4 FLA. TAX REV. 1
(1998).
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resources in an effort to gain every advantage possible in the crowded• • . 207
markets for glamorous jobs.
The net result is that the overall labor force is less productive than
it would otherwise be, and resources are wasted in pursuit of high-
paying professions. This is in direct contrast to the standard notion
that high pay is necessary to get people to work hard (i.e., to be
productive) and to be willing to work in highly paid and highly
productive professions. It is possible, in fact, that the extra hard work
associated with attempts to enter these "winner-take-all" markets is
not productive work at all - even assuming that it is always possible
for people to raise their marginal effort.
One policy that this analysis suggests is, obviously, progressive
taxation. Anything that narrows the spread between the highest paid
(net of taxes) and the lowest paid will reduce (but not eliminate) the
wasteful competition to reach the higher ends of the pay spectrum.
This is not, however, an argument only for higher taxes, because the
effect is only seen at the high end of the earnings curve. Winner-take-
all analysis suggests, if anything, that the taxes on mundane jobs might
even be reduced at the same time that taxes on the highest incomes
are raised, because a larger difference in the tax rates will reduce the
temptation for people to waste their talents aiming for the most
lucrative jobs.
The source of the inefficiency in this analysis is that too many
people are spending time and effort trying to enter professions for
which they will never quite qualify. If winner-take-all theory is
correct, and if the labor provided by potential workers in the highest
paid jobs is at all elastic, then there should be a shift whereby workers
spend less time in futile attempts to gain glamorous jobs and instead
work toward improving their skills to prepare for more achievable
jobs. Since the number of glamorous jobs is limited (the total
numbers of players on professional basketball rosters, for example,
being a set number), this would mean that we would end up with just
as many people in the glamour jobs and everyone else having more
productively spent their time on achievable goals.
In short, the efficiency story regarding income averaging is murky
at best, but the addition of winner-take-all considerations to the mix
adds one more reason to suspect that raising taxes on the highest
income earners could have beneficial economic effects. Such effects
might ultimately be overwhelmed in a definitive empirical test of the
overall behavioral implications of adopting a system of income
207 FRANK & COOK, supra note 206, at 8.
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averaging. Until such a test is completed, though, the efficiency
analysis does little to counterbalance the negative conclusions from
the equity and simplicity analyses above. The case for income
averaging on all counts thus appears to be very weak, except at lower
income levels.
Notably, the efficiency case does not become less murky when we
confine ourselves to the more limited averaging system that I have
advocated above. Unlike the discussion regarding simplicity, the
Targeted Averaging plan does not appear to be more amenable to
clear-cut efficiency analysis than a more general averaging plan. The
conclusions above regarding the lack of appeal of a large-scale
averaging system and the appeal of a Targeted Averaging system are
neither strengthened nor weakened by efficiency analysis.
C. Macroeconomic Implications
Although it is beyond the scope of this article, it is also worth
noting that a nonequity-based argument can be made in favor of
income averaging from a macroeconomic perspective. Specifically,
the refundable nature of a Vickrey-like system of cumulative taxation
would guarantee that, in the event of an economic downturn,
taxpayers would receive refunds of previously paid taxes. This would
have the effect of being an enhanced "automatic stabilizer," which is a
feature of the fiscal system that - without intervention by Congress
during a business cycle - will tend to reduce the severity of swings in
the economy. The income tax itself is an automatic stabilizer, because
it "cuts taxes" when incomes fall during a recession. A refundable
averaging system would not merely reduce tax collections but would
have the government giving taxpayers refunds, which they could then
spend.
The effects of the refundable averaging system on macroeconomic
outcomes would also include changes in the size of the "fiscal
multipliers," which determine the ultimate size of the change in
national income due to a change in policy. Such considerations could
well turn out to be an independent source of support for adopting an
averaging system.
VI. CONCLUSION
This article has analyzed the idea of replacing our current annual
system of tax assessment with a system that bases tax assessments on
income averaged over the space of years or even a lifetime. After
summarizing the fundamental goals of tax reform, especially with
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regard to the equity issues raised by income averaging, I examined
whether adopting any system of income averaging that would be
available to all taxpayers (including, but certainly not limited to,
William Vickrey's full-scale cumulative averaging system) would
achieve a compelling change in the fairness of the tax system. While
the current system creates a possible problem of horizontal inequity in
that people with similar lifetime incomes can pay different tax rates
based on the timing of those incomes, there is a serious question
whether - when taking all circumstances into account - such
differences are really horizontal inequities at all. In any case, my
analysis suggests that tax reform should be based on vertical equity
concerns, not horizontal concerns.
Even if the differences in tax treatment for those with volatile
incomes are seen as inequities, those inequities as they apply to
higher-income earners are ultimately not compelling enough to justify
a restructuring of the U.S. tax system that would allow income
averaging for all taxpayers. The poor (and perhaps the lower reaches
of the middle class), however, are uniquely burdened by the volatile
nature of their income streams. I therefore endorse a plan recently
offered by Lily Batchelder to allow lower-income people to smooth
their incomes in order to avoid a loss of tax benefits. This plan has the
distinct advantage of not requiring a broad restructuring of the tax
system, providing targeted relief to the neediest Americans through
minimal legislative intervention.
In addition to the normative analysis of income averaging plans, I
also analyzed the possibility that averaging systems might be worth
adopting on the basis of improving the simplicity or efficiency of the
tax system. I concluded that a broad-based income averaging plan is
likely to be viewed as quite complicated; and only the very limited
system aimed at the poor and near-poor that I advocate would be
sufficiently uncomplicated to justify adoption - especially when those
minimized complexity costs are weighed against the equity gains for
lower-income taxpayers. The efficiency analysis, by contrast, provides
no clear guidance either way, although so-called "winner-take-all"
analysis suggests at least one reason to deny to high-income earners
the advantages of income averaging.
In short, this article has argued that income averaging does have a
valuable role to play in achieving better normative outcomes for the
tax system and society as a whole; but that role should be very limited
and apply only to lower-income workers. A systemic change toward
taxing average income rather than annual income appears to be
unjustified on the grounds of equity, simplicity, or efficiency.
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